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This work presents a two-country two-stage growth model capturing the special relationship that 
has emerged in recent years between the US and China (the so-called BWII regime described by 
Dooley et al., 2003). The Chinese authorities maintain a competitive (i.e., undervalued) exchange 
rate in order to sustain the high-productive exporting sectors, foster growth and absorb the large 
amount  of  rural  workers  into  the  industrial  sector.  Thus,  China  runs  current  account  surpluses 
against the US and accumulates US assets in the form of foreign reserves. The US policy-makers 
are supposedly more concerned with keeping high the consumption possibilities of the population 
and exploit the Chinese willingness to finance the US external deficits. We consider three scenarios 
for  the  future  state  of  the  Sino-American  co-dependency.  All  the  scenarios  share  phase  1, 
resembling what has actually occurred in recent years, but differ in accordance with what fiscal 
policy  the  Chinese  authorities  adopt,  and  whether  and  when  China  fully  liberalizes  its  capital 
account and floats the currency (thus starting phase 2). Scenario A is quite optimistic because the 
Chinese fiscal policy is effective in partially substituting the mercantilist policy undertaken in phase 
1  as  a  fundamental  source  of  demand  for  tradables  and  as  an  engine  of  growth.  Scenario  B 
emphasizes  the  risks  for  China  of  abandoning  too  early  the  peg  of  the  exchange  rate.  Finally, 
Scenario C shows that a Chinese continuation of the current export-led growth strategy can be 
economically feasible and lead to the mobilization of the Chinese manpower into the advanced 
sectors of the economy. 
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1. Introduction
ª 
According to the “Sino-American co-dependency” view (put forward by Dooley et al., 2003, 
2004a,b, 2007, 2009), China aims at maintaining a competitive (i.e. undervalued) exchange rate so 
as to sustain its high-productive exporting sectors and to foster growth in a measure sufficient to 
absorb the large amount of rural workers into the industrial sector.
1 China, in addition, employs 
capital  controls  to  avoid  the  speculative  inflows  generated  by  the  expected  appreciation  of  its 
currency  and  maintains  a  high  degree  of  domestic  financial  repression  in  order  to  control  the 
allocation among competing uses of the capital blocked in the country. As a result of this policy, the 
Chinese authorities accumulate large stocks of US financial assets. The US, in its turns, exploits the 
Chinese  willingness  to  finance  its  persistent  current  account  deficit  by  maintaining  high 
consumption levels, thus boosting the American demand for Chinese products while maintaining 
low interest rates and subdued inflation.
2 
Dooley and co-authors argued that this arrangement represented a successful development 
strategy for China and other Asian economies and, accordingly, maintained that this strategy could 
have continued as long as growth would have remained the principal goal of the policymakers of 
these  emerging  markets.  After  the  crisis  of  2008,  however,  it  is  has  become  apparent  that  US 
current account deficits  of the size displayed in the  years immediately  preceding the  crisis are 
unsustainable, and that the inevitable down-sizing of these deficits will permanently reduce the 
room for China’s export-led growth strategy. This recognition has accelerated the debate on the 
changes in policy that are necessary in the medium and longer run to “rebalance” the growth pattern 
of  China.  In  recent  years,  indeed,  several  studies  have  advocated  policy  shifts  that  may  help 
rebalance  Chinese  growth  away  from  heavy  dependence  on  external  demand,  investment  and 
industry,  and  toward  domestic  demand,  consumption  and  services  (Aziz,  2006;  Blanchard  and 
Giavazzi, 2006; Kuijs and Wang, 2006; Lardy, 2006; Prasad, 2009; Prasad and Rajan, 2006; Zheng 
et al., 2009). This literature has been criticized on the ground that the key to China’s buoyant 
growth is the rapid transition into producing tradables (mainly manufactures), and that, therefore, a 
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et al., 2009). 
2  The US plays the role of a financial intermediary (Caballero et al., 2008, and Mendoza et al., 2007), reflected also in 
the favorable return differential on the US international gross assets and liabilities (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007a,b).   2 
correction in China’s policy mix which slows down this process of structural change will also result 
in a reduction in the economy’s longer-term growth rate (Rodrik, 2009a, 2009b): “This would be a 
bad bargain for China, and it is an important reason why the Chinese authorities have resisted a 
significant appreciation of their currency (which, in the absence of other compensating policies, 
would have the effect of reducing the profitability of investment in tradables)” (Rodrik, 2009b). It is 
implicit in Rodrik’s assessment the conviction that the abandonment of rapid growth as the main 
objective of the Chinese economic policy would be premature, at a stage in which China’s per 
capita GDP is still a small fraction of that of the most advanced countries. One could speculate that 
China’s leadership is likely to share this conviction, especially considering that economic growth is 
not only a necessary condition for raising people’s consumption levels,
3 but it is also perceived as a 
means for boosting national power and prestige.   
Our  paper  contributes  to  this  debate  by  providing  an  analytical  setup  able  to  reproduce 
several  aspects  of  the  “Sino-American  co-dependency”  story  and  broadly  consistent  with  the 
available evidence.  Indeed, we present a two-stage growth model that captures some important 
features of what happened in the recent past and that allows the evaluation of alternative scenarios 
of the evolution of the Sino-American relationship in the medium and longer-term. Accordingly, the 
first stage of the model is characterized by an interaction similar to that described by Dooley and 
co-authors: a developed country (the United States) runs current account deficits against a large and 
fast-growing developing country (China), whose monetary authorities accumulate foreign reserves 
so as to set the exchange rate at a level that guarantees the continuous growth of external demand 
and the absorption into the most productive sectors of the working population employed in the least 
productive ones. The second stage of the model, instead, reflects the possible scenarios that can 
materialize, depending on whether China liberalizes the capital account and floats the currency, on 
its fiscal policies and on the timing of the regime switch.
4 Therefore, we focus on the policy options 
of the Chinese authorities, while assuming the existence of a strong incentive for the US policy-
makers to exploit the possibility of running a persistent external deficit in order to guarantee a high 
level of domestic consumption. Under this respect, the model allows to discuss the possible reasons 
that may suggest to the Chinese authorities to keep on financing a limited US external deficit, thus 
relaxing the intertemporal budget constraint of the US economy. In other words, our formal setup 
                                                 
3 With regard to this, those remarking the fact that consumption represents a strikingly small share of China’s total 
expenditure, and thus invoking a drastic rebalancing of growth toward consumption in order to let the households fully 
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appreciation envisaged by Devereux and Genberg (2007).   3 
accounts for the possibility that the US faces a “soft” intertemporal budget constraint, while—in the 
long  run  perspective  of  the  model—it  is  not  relevant  how  the  US  external  debt  is  divided  up 
according to government and private sector net liabilities. 
We explicitly consider three alternative policy scenarios. In Scenario A, the composition of 
China’s government expenditures is such that fiscal policy is effective in shifting domestic demand 
toward  tradables,  thus  raising  the  profitability  of  investment  in  the  tradable  sector.  Hence,  the 
Chinese authorities are able to adopt a mix of fiscal policy and exchange rate pegging that allows in 
time to absorb all domestic manpower in the modern sectors of the economy, and—as soon as this 
objective is reached—to liberalize the capital account and let the exchange rate float. Notably, even 
when the exchange rate is permitted to float, the Chinese authorities may still be willing to finance 
persistent US trade deficits in order to sustain long-run growth. In Scenario B, the composition of 
China’s government expenditures is such that fiscal policy is less effective in substituting exports as 
a source of demand for Chinese tradables, and China’s authorities end up liberalizing the capital 
account and floating the currency before all Chinese manpower is absorbed in the modern sectors of 
the economy. By doing so, they do allow for larger domestic consumption in the short run, but they 
depress long-run growth and maintain some of the labor force entrapped into the traditional sector 
of the economy. In Scenario C, the Chinese authorities neither liberalize the capital account nor 
make  the  currency  float;  rather,  they  implement  the  same  strategy  which  has  characterized  the 
recent past: the renminbi (RMB) is maintained undervalued so as to let the Chinese economy grow 
asymptotically faster than the US, consistently with an alleged mercantilist political objective. On 
the other hand, Chinese domestic consumption remains compressed and reserves expand further. 
Our work shares some features with other recent contributions on structural change in China, 
but  it  differs  along  several  dimensions,  thus  contributing  to  this  strand  of  the  literature.  While 
Lipschitz et al. (2009) encompasses a real neoclassical growth model, treats China as a small open 
economy and, by mainly focusing on FDI-related capital flows, is silent on the current account and 
on  the  exchange  rate,  our  model  adopts  a  two-country  growth  framework  and  addresses  the 
evolution of the current account, the exchange rate regime and the government policy mix. In doing 
so, our work contributes to the literature exploring the relationship between exchange rate policy, 
capital account management and growth (see Levy-Yayati and Sturzenegger, 2009, and Montiel and 
Serven, 2008). The nature of the structural change, instead, distinguishes Song et al. (2009) from 
our work: while we look at the transition of part of the labor force from the traditional to the 
advanced sectors of the economy, Song and co-authors study the reallocation of resources among 
heterogeneous firms (different in terms of ownership, productivity and access to credit) within the 
manufacturing sector.    4 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  briefly  discusses  the  “Sino-
American co-dependency view” as one among the strands of the literature on global imbalances and 
then  presents  some  stylized  facts  regarding  the  relationship  between  the  US  and  China.  The 
building  blocks  and  the  derivation  of  the  model  are  discussed  in  section  3,  while  the 
characterization of the equilibrium path is presented in section 4. Section 5 is dedicated to growth 
dynamics under the abovementioned three policy scenarios. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Global imbalances and the Sino-American co-dependency 
2.1 Relevant literature  
 
Global imbalances, that is the accumulation of large current account deficits by the US vis-
à-vis the rest of the world over time, have engaged many economists in a lively debate since the 
early 2000s. The phenomenon, albeit ongoing during the last 30 years, has accelerated remarkably 
in the last decade. At the time of Bretton Woods, these imbalances were the by-product of the 
catching up process of industrializing nations and, accordingly, US deficits were mainly financed 
by European and Japanese saving. Since the early 2000s, the role once played by Europe and Japan 
has  been  played  by  the  fast-growing  Asian  economies  and  some  oil-producing  nations.  These 
economies  have  run  large  current  account  surpluses  and  accumulated  massive  official  foreign 
reserves, mainly US Treasury bonds denominated in US dollars. 
Several are the rationales for the accumulation of foreign reserves by emerging economies 
running current account and financial account surpluses
5: these countries i) have been engaged in 
fixed (or highly managed) exchange rate regimes to ensure a steady growth of exports and GDP; ii) 
have been motivated by a precautionary motive (in light of the high costs connected to a potential 
reversal of private capital inflows or to the occurrence of foreign exogenous shocks); iii) have used 
reserves  as  a  form  of  collateral  to  attract  steady  foreign  investment.
6 Remarkably,  this  reserve 
accumulation has continued over time despite the increased cost opportunity of allocating resources 
to  low-yield  foreign  assets  and  notwithstanding  the  risks  connected  to  the  valuation  effects 
stemming from the variations in the exchange rates of their currencies with respect to the USD.
7 
The US, in its turn, has played the role of a financial intermediary, which gathers foreign savings by 
issuing safe, liquid and low-yield securities and reinvests a part of them as domestic (high risk) 
                                                 
5 See Aizenman and Lee (2007,2008), Dooley et al (2004c), Jeanne and Ranciere (2008) and Wyplosz (2007). 
6 Countries exporting primary commodities accumulated reserves also so as to reduce the threat of the “Dutch disease”. 
7 See Rodrik (2006a) on the “fiscal” and “social” costs of hoarding reserves and on its negative effects on the domestic 
banking system, when domestic banks are forced to purchase low-yield central bank sterilization bonds.    5 
investments, as well as foreign direct investments in the very same countries from which the funds 
had come.
8  
While there is not much disagreement on this characterization of the phenomenon of global 
imbalances
9, it has remained highly debated whether this implicit international arrangement can be 
conceptualized as an equilibrium, and what are its main underlying forces. Some rationalizations 
accounting for the global imbalances focus on specific issues: diverging saving patterns in the US 
and in most emerging countries; differences in the relative quality of and expected returns from US 
and foreign assets; heterogeneous degrees of financial development of the various countries.
10 The 
“Sino-American co-dependency” view (put forward by Dooley et al., 2003), instead, has more a 
systemic flavor.  
Dooley and co-authors argued that the abovementioned pattern of US external deficits is 
consistent with a revived Bretton Woods regime (called “Bretton Woods II” or BWII), based on a 
core-periphery  division  of  the  world.  The  heart  of  the  idea  is  that  developing  countries  (the 
periphery) aim at maintaining competitive (i.e., undervalued) exchange rates so as to sustain the 
highly productive exporting sectors and to foster growth in a measure sufficient to absorb the large 
amount of rural workers into the industrial sector. These  countries, in  addition, employ  capital 
controls to avoid the speculative inflows generated by the expected appreciation of their currencies 
and maintain a high degree of domestic financial repression in order to control the allocation among 
competing uses of the capital blocked in the countries.
11 The US (the core), instead, exploits the 
privileged position of the dollar and the degree of development of its financial sector to enjoy high 
consumption and income growth, while maintaining low interest rates and subdued inflation. 
                                                 
8 See Caballero et al (2008), Dooley et al. (2007) and Mendoza et al. (2007) on this. In fact, Chinn and Ito (2007,2008) 
and Gruber and Kamin (2007, 2008) find limited empirical support for this interpretation. 
9 On the debate on whether statistical and data collection practices affect the perceived size of the global imbalances, 
see Cline (2005), Cooper (2006), Gross (2006), Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006), and Kregel (2008). 
10 As  in  Eichengreen  (2006a,b)  and  Fracasso  (2007),  these  rationalizations  could  be  summarized  in  some  of  the 
following terms: i) the “deficient US savings view”(Roubini and Setser, 2004; Krugman, 2007); ii) the “new economy 
view” (Cooper, 2006, and Engel and Rogers, 2006); iii) the “global savings glut view” (Bernanke, 2005; Calvo and 
Talvi, 2006); iv) the “investment drought view” (see Rajan, 2006a,b; Makin, 2006). 
11 In China, an additional reason for favoring the exporting sector can be identified in the weak conditions of the 
domestic banking system. High domestic saving, capital controls and politically-driven allocation of credit to state-
owned companies would lead to a misallocation of capital across sectors and to increasing nonperforming banking loans. 
To avoid excessive overinvestment in the nontradable sector without raising interest rates much (that would attract 
capital inflows), the Chinese authorities adopted a twofold approach: on the one hand, they restricted credit creation 
through  administrative  measures  (as  we  will  show  in  the  next  section)  and,  on  the  other  hand,  they  secured  an 
undervalued exchange rate to stimulate the external demand of tradable goods. See Clarida (2005), Makin (2006), 
Prasad and Rajan (2006), Prasad (2009), Rajan (2006b), and Zheng et al. (2009) on this account.   6 
Leaving aside the issue of whether the recent situation does or does not (as contended for 
instance by Eichengreen, 2004,
  and Rose, 2007) resemble the original Bretton Woods system
12, the 
mechanism  proposed  by  Dooley  and  co-authors  seems  a  reasonable  explanation  for  the  forces 
underlying the formation of global imbalances, in particular with respect to the Chinese and US 
relationship. Even though this rationalization has been questioned, criticisms have mainly focused 
on the sustainability of the proposed co-dependency, on the expected duration of the imbalances, 
and on the mounting costs of the future reversal of ever-increasing imbalances, rather than on its 
plausibility.
13 Indeed, this account of the Sino-American co-dependency well reflects the different 
objectives that the Chinese and US policy-makers have pursued in the last decade and may continue 
to pursue in the future.
14 
Dooley and co-authors argued that this arrangement was a reasonable development strategy 
for several Asian economies (China in primis) and, accordingly, that it could continue as long as the 
policymakers of these emerging markets would aim at fostering the growth of GDP. While these 
authors  reckoned  that  sooner  or  later  the  Asian  periphery  would  reach  a  developmental  stage 
allowing it to join the core (and thus float the currency, liberalize the capital account, and de-
cumulate  foreign  reserves),  they  also  maintained  that  the  relationship  between  the  US  and  the 
periphery would remain sustainable in an unspecified “near term” given that China and other Asian 
economies were still far from graduating to the center.
15 
As the continuation of the Chinese growth strategy entails growing costs, many have argued 
that a regime change is likely to occur in the future. Accumulating foreign reserves, raising the 
Chinese rate of growth and fostering mobilization of the labor force in the transitional path require 
the maintenance of a permanently subdued level of domestic consumption, the imposition of capital 
                                                 
12 In a nutshell, Eichengreen (2004) argues that the current situation and Bretton Woods I differ in that: 1) the US run 
current account surpluses and financial account deficits (due to high internal saving rates) in the 60s, while it runs 
current and financial account deficits (due to low internal saving rates) now; 2) peripheral countries today are less 
organized and share less homogenous priorities than the surplus countries (the Gold Pool) in the '60s; 3) the euro 
represents an alternative reserve currency that was absent in the past; 4) managing the exchange rate is more difficult 
today, since sterilization costs are proportional to the international degree of capital mobility; 5) managed exchange 
rates and low interest rates in emerging markets tend to end up in asset bubbles (rather than in productive investments in 
traded sector) today than in the past, when financial regulations were tighter. 
13 On the sustainability of the imbalances and on the expected depreciation of the dollar, see Blanchard et al. (2005), 
Eichengreen (2004, 2006a,b), Krugman (2007), Mann (2002,2004), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005,2007), Roubini and 
Setser (2004,2005) and Roubini (2007). Among the numerous empirical works on the matter, we recall Debelle and 
Galati (2007), Edwards (2005a,b, 2006, 2007), Freund (2005), Freund and Warnock (2007), and Ju and Wei (2007). 
14 These different objectives, in turn, can be explained by the remarkable differences in the two political systems and by 
the inherently diverse priorities connected to the countries being at different stages of development.  
15 As argued by Jan Kregel (2008), China and other developing countries’ strategy of supporting demand for domestic 
resource  mobilization  through  external  demand  rendered  traditional  balance  of  payments  adjustment  mechanisms 
ineffective. This contributed to the persistent expansion of global imbalances.   7 
restrictions, the accumulation of currency exposure towards the dollar, and the subjugation of the 
domestic banking sector to the political leadership. As pointed out by Prasad (2009), the Chinese 
authorities face a trade-off between keeping on with their growth-enhancing, yet costly and risky, 
strategy and shifting to a stage characterized by different internal and external policies.
16 While in 
the past, as argued by Kregel (2008), the opportunity costs of accumulating reserves were high, but 
still  lower  than  the  gains  obtained  from  transferring  part  of  the  rural  population  to  urban 
employment thanks to an export-led growth strategy, in the future this may not be the case.
17 If 
China switches to a more democratic political framework or if its political authorities attempt to 
gain more internal support by reducing the costs and risks associated with the persistence of the 
Sino-American co-dependency, a different international order may emerge and Chinese internal 
growth may be supported by means of other policies.  
As a matter of fact, there are numerous signs that the Chinese authorities are pondering on 
the  strategy  to  undertake  in  the  future.  In  the  second  half  of  2008,  for  instance,  the  monetary 
authorities reduced the purchases of long-term US Treasury securities (besides selling US agency 
bonds)  and  increased  those  of  the  short-term  notes.  In  addition,  a  massive  fiscal  stimulus, 
accompanied  by  restrictive  trade  and  procurement  measures,  has  been  put  in  place  to  foster 
domestic demand. During the first half of 2009, the authorities in China took also actions (such as 
the  establishment  of  bilateral  local  currency  swaps  worth  more  than  RMB600bn  with  a  few 
commercial partners, the acceleration of pilot programs using the RMB in cross-border settlements, 
the promotion of investment opportunities in Hong Kong for foreign RMB holders, the advances in 
regional monetary cooperation and reserve pooling arrangement among ASEAN+3 parties
18) to 
encourage  the  international  use  of  the  renminbi  and  put  forward  the  proposal  of  introducing  a 
“super-sovereign” reserve currency in place of the US dollar.  
While some sections of the press have interpreted this proposal as a sign of China trying to 
exit the Sino-American co-dependency, this arrangement would in fact allow China to differentiate 
the denomination of its reserve holdings while simultaneously maintaining an export-led growth 
                                                 
16 The US authorities are clearly confronted with a similar trade-off. On the one hand, the persistence of the existing 
Sino-American relationship in the long run is likely to reduce the relative size of the US economy and increase its 
dependency on foreign capital inflows. On the other hand, the maintenance of such relationship might ensure a high net 
present value of US consumption which, thanks to the Chinese reserve accumulation, can expand beyond what would 
otherwise be possible.  
17 Guo and N’Diaye (2009), Kuijs and Wang (2006), Lardy (2006), Prasad (2009) and Zheng et al. (2009) discuss the 
difficulties in maintaining an export-driven pattern of growth. Bagnai (2008) evaluates the impact of a set of Chinese 
domestic policy actions on global imbalances and Chinese growth. 
18 See Zhang M. (2009) for a discussion of the China’s new international financial strategy.   8 
strategy in line with the continuation of the current situation.
19 Similarly, and notwithstanding the 
crisis, US-dollar denominated Chinese reserves have kept on growing during the first quarters of 
2009. These controversial pieces of evidence suggest that the issues discussed in this work are still 
open and that further theoretical and empirical research is warranted to inform the lively political 
discussion. Accordingly, our work aims at providing an analytical tool to understand and interpret 
the Sino-American co-dependency and to evaluate its alternative future scenarios.  
2.2 Stylized facts on the Sino-American co-dependency. 
 
Historically,  current  account  and  trade  imbalances  are  recurrent  phenomena.  The  global 
imbalances to which we refer here, instead, are those characterizing the period after the early 2000s. 
The imbalances characterizing the most recent period, in particular, mostly depend on the bilateral 
relationship between the US and China, called “Sino-American co-dependency” or “Chimerica”.  
 
Current and trade account balances. Since mid-90s, both China and the US have run persistent 
overall trade and current account imbalances, whose size has rapidly increased since the early 2003-
2004 (Figure 1). In 2007, the Chinese current account surplus exceeded 10% of the GDP whereas 
the US deficits almost reached 6% over the GDP in 2005 and 2006. The diverging patterns of the 
overall balances for the two countries are not independent: the bilateral relationship between the US 
and China heavily affected their positions against the rest of the world (Figure 2). While China 
accounted for about 20% of the US deficits in early 2000s, the percentage reached almost 40 in 
more recent years. Notably, notwithstanding the surge in the value of US oil imports since 2004, the 
share  of  the  US  deficits  ascribable  to  China  has  been  larger  than  that  of  the  oil  producing 
countries.
20 
                                                 
19 It is not a case that several economists at the Peterson Institute for International Economics supported this last version 
of the Chinese proposal,  which  would allow  the continuation of the Sino-American co-dependency  without China 
bearing the valuation risks connect to a devaluation of the dollar against the renminbi. While US financial institutions in 
the past took lots of credit risk and misallocated credit among alternative uses, the Chinese central bank took currency 
risk. As observed by Brad Setser on his CFR blog, Chinese authorities seem more concerned with this than with the 
idea of keeping on with accumulating financial claims on the rest of the world. 
20 It is worth noticing that Chinese and US estimates of the US trade deficit differ considerably because of different 
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Figure 2. Chinese share of US trade and current account components. Source: BEA 
 
International  investment  positions.  The  persistence  accumulation  of  current  account  deficits 
(surpluses) by the US (China) portends a negative (positive) international investment position that 
has grown in size over time. The US is now the largest debtor in the world, and China and Japan are 
its largest creditors. 
It is worth noting that, while both the public and private sectors in the US have recorded 
deficits financed by borrowing in the international markets, only the official Chinese sector was 
allowed to intermediate capital abroad. Hence, monetary authorities in China have accumulated 
high international reserves, most of which denominated in US dollars, and have thus contributed to 
finance the US external deficits (Figure 3).
21 According to Prasad and Sorkin (2009), the current 
account surplus accounted for 91% of the accumulation of reserves from 2004 to 2008. 
                                                 
21 With official reserves we refer to total reserves minus gold holdings. In the calculations proposed in this section we 
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Figure 3. US external debt (cumulated since 1999 and actual) and Chinese reserves. Sources: BEA and IFS 
 
In 2008, China overcame Japan in terms of total reserves and became the largest official creditor of 
the US. In April 2009, the Chinese authorities announced that foreign exchange reserves touched $2 
trillion, accounting  for  about 30% of  global reserves.
22 As shown in Figure 4, Chinese official 
reserves have grown both with respect to the rapidly expanding GDP and in relation to the (steadily 
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Figure 4. Chinese foreign reserves and US Treasury holdings.  Sources: IFS and US Treasury (TIC) 
 
The relative importance of Chinese official reserves may be in fact even greater than these 
official statistics suggest. The data reported here might underestimate the actual amount of reserves 
directly or indirectly in the hands of the Chinese authorities, because of i) a custodial center bias 
(which, however, is probably more important in the case of Middle East exporters), ii) the People’s 
                                                 
22 According to Brad Setser, total China’s foreign portfolio reached $2bn in June 2008. It is worth noting in passing that 
although oil exporting countries did accumulate reserves too, they diversified their assets to a greater extent, particularly 
through the intermediation of national sovereign wealth funds (Alberola and Serena, 2008).   11 
Bank of China (PBC)’s control over Chinese banks’ external asset purchases, and iii) the recent 
creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (CIC) financed with $200 billion of official reserves. 
The US international investment position (IIP) has worsened by less than what implied by 
the sum of its current and capital account deficits (Figure 3). This evolution of the US net foreign 
asset position is mainly due to favorable valuation effects and capital gains that the US has enjoyed 
because of the composition and the currency denomination of its gross positions.
23 This can be 
better appreciated in Figures 3 and 5, where the relative importance of the annual accumulation of 
dollar  denominated  assets  by  the  Chinese  authorities  is  compared  to  the  US  current  account 
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Figure 5. Changes in the US IIP and in the Chinese official reserves in USD. Sources: BEA and IFS dataset. 
 
The relative importance of the Chinese accumulation of reserves is even clearer if one looks at the 
distribution of US Treasury (UST) securities across domestic and foreign bond holders. Though 
overall international reserves are far larger than the Chinese ones (since oil producing countries, 
Japan and other Asian countries hold large stocks too), these latter are largely concentrated on UST 
securities. At the end of 2008, $3 trillion securities were in the hands of non-US residents, of which 
$2 trillion were held by foreign official institutions (Figure 6). According to our calculations based 
on UST TIC data, China’s holdings of short and long-term UST securities passed from $60 billion 
in 2000 up to $400 in 2006, and reached $800 billion in August 2009. 
                                                 
23 See  Tille  (2003,  2008a,b),  Higgins  et  al  (2005),  Gourinchas  and  Rey  (2007a,b),  and  Xafa  (2007)  on  return 
differentials and on valuation effects.  
24 The recent valuation effects were favorable to the US (in part because of the steady depreciation of the dollar since 
2001) and this contributed to postpone the creation of a stabilizing feedback in the US (see Warnock, 2008). The wealth 
losses accrued to the foreign holders of US assets did not speed up the rebalancing process either. The fact that reserves 
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Figure 6. Domestic and foreign holdings of US Treasury securities. Source: US Treasury (TIC) 
 
The  importance  of  the  Chinese  acquisitions  of  UST  securities  is  more  evident  if  one 
considers flows rather than stock holdings: China’s net purchases of long-term UST bonds and 
notes accounted for 27% and 33% ($847 billion and $861 billion) of all countries’ purchases in 
2008 and in the first eight months of 2009, respectively. The large accumulation of long-term UST 
securities over time can in part account for the Greenspan’s conundrum during 2003-2005. 
Large purchases of short-term UST and federal agency securities contributed to expand the 
US assets in Chinese hands. In the second half of 2008, in particular, China heavily invested in 
short-term UST securities: its holdings passed from $13 billion in June 2008 to $165 billion in 
December of the same year.
25 At least until June 2008, China did also purchase billions of US 
federal agency and private sector bonds. According to the BEA, in mid-2008 China held more than 
30% of all federal agencies debt in foreign hands.  
The  possibility  that  China  could  stop  buying  UST  securities  has  represented  a  serious 
concern in the press and among policymakers, and this is likely to continue in the light of the 
prospective negative conditions of the US fiscal balances. In order to support the financial system 
and tackle the credit crunch, the US political authorities put in place a large fiscal stimulus package 
and bailed out several financial institutions. The US fiscal deficit jumped from $0.46 in 2008 to 
$1.42 trillion in 2009 and the federal debt held by the public increased from 41% up to 55% of GDP. 
Considering also the debt to be rolled over, the US Treasury might end up issuing more than $2 
trillion in 2009, entering in direct competition with a corporate sector unable to tap bank credit. 
China’s  commitment  to  purchase  the  newly  issued  securities  and  to  roll  over  the  debt  due  for 
payment is thus crucial for the US strategy to redress domestic growth. Notwithstanding recent 
covert threats of diversifying the official reserves, the Chinese authorities repeatedly pledged to 
                                                 
25 This was a global trend. Official and private foreign holdings of short-term UST securities doubled (from $376 to 
$756 billion) in the second half of 2008. Foreign official institutions increased their holdings from $226 to $460 billion. 
Though short-term UST securities holdings grew also in the first half of 2009, the trend recently abated worldwide.   13 
keep on with the acquisitions. This suggests that, at least in the medium term, the Sino-American 
co-dependency will persist. 
 
Exchange rates. In 1994 and 1995, the Chinese authorities radically modified exchange rate policy: 
they abolished exchange rate controls on current account transactions, unified the exchange rate and 
started to peg the renminbi to the US dollar. The peg, initially set at 8.7 RMB per dollar, was kept 
for ten years at 8.28 RMB per dollar: this strategy helped China to expand its tradable sector while 
anchoring the domestic price level. In 2005, however, the authorities chose to transform this regime 
into a managed float with reference to a basket of 11 currencies, with unannounced weights.
26 
Although authorities proceeded with a de facto peg until the end of 2005, the new regime became 
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Figure 7. US and China exchange rate indices (January 1995=8.46).  Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (RMB/USD) and BIS (broad effective exchange rate indices). 
 
The  regime  switch  in  2005  did  not  take  market  participants  by  surprise:  since  2003  an 
appreciation of the RMB was anticipated in forward markets and expectations of appreciation were 
feeding large speculative financial inflows in China. Three main facts may account for the exchange 
rate regime switch: the first is the very large size of Chinese current account surpluses; the second is 
the growing problems encountered by the authorities in managing (i.e., sterilizing) the large capital 
inflows stimulated by the expectations of the appreciation of the currency (net financial inflows 
doubled in 2004 and drastically fell in 2005 and 2006 after the regime switch); the third is the 
                                                 
26 The new regime allowed for a daily ±0.3% movement of RMB against each currency of the basket, which implies a 
maximum 6% upward or downward trend per month. This arrangement was thus consistent with the implementation of 
a de facto crawling peg to the dollar.   14 
international  pressure  in  favor  of  a  more  flexible  RMB,  whose  alleged  undervaluation  was 
considered as responsible for the difficulties of US and European exporting sectors. 
The Chinese regime switch in 2005 has been read either as a sign of recognition of some 
RMB fundamental misalignment, or as a Chinese concession to the anxious American Congressmen. 
Most likely, however, the policy shift represents an attempt of the monetary authorities to gradually 
increase  exchange  rate  flexibility  and  recover  monetary  policy  independence.  The  Chinese 
authorities, committed to favoring the absorption of the rural population into the tradable sectors of 
the economy and concerned about the negative valuation effects linked to an abrupt depreciation of 
the dollar on the reserves and the banking system, believed that a more radical regime switch (i.e. 
floating  the exchange rate) was still premature.
27 It is worth noticing that while many US-based 
economists  and  politicians  have  repeatedly  argued  that  the  USD-RMB  exchange  rate  was 
overvalued, notwithstanding the  gradual adjustment following the adoption of a managed float, 
there  is  not  clear  empirical  evidence  on  the  degree  of  undervaluation  of  the  renminbi
28,  nor 
consensus on the desirability of accelerating its appreciation. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  Chinese  and  American  nominal  and  real  effective  exchange  rates 
appreciated hand in hand on a trade weighted basis until 2002 (Figure 8). This pattern changed in 
2002: the depreciating trend stopped in 2005 for the RMB, whereas it continued for the USD until 
2008.
29 The inception of the financial crisis led to an only temporary stabilization of the dollar in 
the second half of 2008, but the dollar went back to its depreciating trend in 2009. We will not 
embark here on a discussion on the degree of undervaluation of the RMB: the Chinese development 
strategy is qualified by the Chinese fiscal policy and by the feature of the exchange rate regime, and 
not by the exchange rate level against the USD per se. As we shall discuss in greater detail in 
section 5, China may preserve its positive trade balance by modulating its fiscal policy, not just 
controlling the exchange rate. 
Saving and investment. National accounting identities imply that trade imbalances correspond to 
saving-investment  domestic  imbalances:  accordingly,  the  Sino-American  current  account 
imbalances are reflected in Chinese (US) investment lower (higher) than domestic saving (Figure 8). 
The US net borrowing needs have risen since 2000 and, after reaching 6% of gross national income 
                                                 
27 As argued by McKinnon (2006 and 2007) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004 and 2006), the Chinese authorities were 
also concerned about the deflationary risks connected to an excessive appreciation of the RMB and the weak financial 
conditions of the domestic banking sector. 
28 See for instance Cline (2008), Coudert and Couharde (2007), Cheung et al (2007), Frankel and Wei (2007) and 
Frankel (2009). 
29 The declining trend of the USD was more substantial against the currencies of the major commercial partners, though 
not necessarily against the countries with the largest bilateral surpluses. See Fracasso and Schiavo (2008,2009).   15 
(GNI) in 2006, stabilized around 5%. China, on the contrary, has kept on recording positive and 
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Figure 8. Gross saving and investment in the US and China (% of GNI). Sources: BEA (NIPA and ESA) and 
ABD (Key Indicators). 
 
While US gross domestic investment (as well as gross capital formation) remained stable in the last 
decade in terms of GNI, domestic saving has steadily fallen since 2000: net government saving 
turned negative in 2002 (and remained so afterwards), net private saving halved, and net corporate 
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Figure 9. Decomposition of US net saving (% of GDP). Source: BEA 
 
The decomposition of the US net saving (Figure 9) reveals that its progressive decline owes both to 
a shift in the sign (from positive to negative) of the government fiscal balance after 2002 and to a 
sharp reduction of personal saving.
30 With the benefit of the hindsight, the reduction in personal 
                                                 
30 Cooper (2006) argues that US saving is underestimated because expenditures on R&D, durables and education (all 
typically high in the US) represent forms of investment rather than consumption.    16 
saving and the stability of investment may be partially accounted for by the presence of a housing 
and credit bubble. In the first quarters of 2009, in the attempt of rebuilding part of the financial 
wealth slashed during the crisis, private saving increased. Such additional saving, however, has 
been relatively modest and anyway smaller than the surge in public borrowing needs: in 2009, as in 
the previous years, the US is going to be a net borrower from the rest of the world. 
China,  on  the  contrary,  has  historically  enjoyed  very  high  national  saving,  even  when 
compared to other countries at the same stage of development. Gross saving, already above 40% of 
GNI in early 2000, reached 50% in 2007. Investment, notwithstanding a steady growth in China in 
the last decade (it passed from less than 40% of GNI in the late 90s to almost 45% in 2008), has 
always fallen short of domestic saving. This and the large inflows of FDI have made China a net 
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Figure 10. Breakdown of gross domestic saving in China. Source: Asian Development Bank 
 
In the period under investigation, China always recorded positive saving in the all (i.e., 
household, corporate and government) domestic sectors. Although personal saving tend to be high 
in any country maintaining an undervalued exchange rate and implementing an export-led growth 
strategy, extraordinary Chinese personal saving owes also to some country-specific factors: i) the 
demographic developments of the population; ii) the accumulation of precautionary saving due to 
high uncertainty about future economic, social, health, pension and education issues (due to the so-
called “breaking of the iron rice bowl”); iii) the declining share of GDP accrued to disposable 
income (as wages  grew less than labor productivity); iv) the high expectations of future house   17 
purchases after the privatization of the housing stock; and v) the permanence of a fragile domestic 
financial system and of borrowing constraints for the households.
31 
Chinese  enterprises,  in  their  turn,  kept  on  accumulating  large  saving  through  retained 
earnings: this was made possible by the remarkable growth of the economy and of firms’ profits, 
the large investment in capital intensive sectors, the steady labor productivity  growth, the high 
precautionary  saving  of  private  entrepreneurial  firms  –  at  risk  of  being  financially  constrained 
because of the limited access to the political-driven banking system (see Song et al., 2009) -, and 
the  scant  incentives  for  state-owned  firms  to  distribute  dividends.  Notwithstanding  such  large 
values,  as  shown  in  Figure  10,  household  saving  has  been  recently  falling  in  relative  term  as 
disposable income has grown less than GDP. This is probably due to large investment in capital 
intensive sectors and to steady labor productivity growth. 
It has been correctly argued that the development and the liberalization of the domestic 
financial sector, together with the privatization of state-owned enterprises and a reduced uncertainty 
about government’s plans on the social safety net, might negatively affect the Chinese saving rate in 
the future. If investment will not decrease as much as saving
32, this may help China to slow down 
the  accumulation  of  current  account  surpluses.  As  argued  by  the  PBC  Governor,  Mr  Zhou 
Xiaouchuan, however, the reduction in the Chinese private saving will be only a gradual process. 
 
Monetary aggregates. Maintaining the peg to the US dollar in the face of increasing current account 
surpluses, abundant inwards FDI and speculative capital inflows (“twin surpluses”) represents a 
challenge  for  the  Chinese  authorities.
33 The  accumulation  of  foreign  exchange  reserves  would 
naturally fuel strong liquidity growth, which would cause a credit boom, the overheating of the 
economy in the short-term, and overinvestment (which instead entails a risk of deflation and of 
growing nonperforming banking loans
34 in the medium term).  
To hold down liquidity growth while continuing to accumulate foreign reserves, Chinese 
authorities have undertaken a massive sterilization effort. Since 2002, when the PBC first issued the 
                                                 
31 See Chamon and Prasad (2008) and Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008), among numerous contributions, on the persistence 
of large private (urban) household saving in the presence of high expected income growth. Lane and Schmukler (2007) 
discuss the origins of high corporate saving and investment in China.  
32 Dollar and Wei (2007) argue that a more efficient allocation could reduce investment intensity by 5% of GDP without 
denting economic growth. This, however, needs not to occur as investment continues to appear profitable. Bai et al. 
(2006), for instance, show that the returns to capital in China have remained high despite steady investment growth. The 
efficiency of sectoral allocation, moreover, has improved over time as the share of investment in the manufacturing 
sector has grown since 2000 (Song et al., 2009).  
33 FDI  are  important  determinants  of  the  “twin  surpluses”  and  help  to  account  for  the  size  of  exchange  rate  and 
sterilization interventions.  
34 The nonperforming loans of the major commercial banks amounted to $150 bn in 2007, approximately equal to 10% 
of the total PBC reserves.   18 
RMB-denominated sterilization bills, commercial banks and other financial institutions have been 
forced to accumulate these assets, which have expanded fast since 2004 and reached the equivalent 


































Figure 11. PBC interventions to drain liquidity. Source: CEIC 
 
In addition, as can be seen in Figure 11, the monetary authorities repeatedly tightened the 
administrative measures in place (such as reserve requirements against deposits) and used their 
direct control on the lending activity of the domestic banking system so as to limit the expansion of 
domestic  credit.  Restrictive  administrative  measures  to  control  liquidity  and  pressures  on  the 
domestic banks to buy sterilization bills were the only instruments in PBC hands: interest rates 
could not be used to check on the credit boom as an increase in the rates would have attracted 
further speculative capital inflows and increased the costs of sterilization.
35 
In 2006, not only almost half of banks’ liquid assets were in low-yield PBC bills, but the 
other half took the form of (mandatory and voluntary) banks’ deposits at the PBC. Almost 25% of 
Chinese commercial banks deposits were invested in either way.
36 Thus, notwithstanding a rapid 
growth of loans and M2 (the average annual growth of 16% repeatedly overshot the official target), 
the loan-to-deposit ratio remained under control and stable with respect to the GDP (Figure 12).  
                                                 
35 Sterilization has been facilitated by the high return differential between US bonds and the sterilization bills. The 
direct costs of sterilization remained relatively low also because of the high degree of financial repression: commercial 
banks have been forced to hold sterilization bills and reserves remunerated at rates lower than the market ones. This 
suggests that the liberalisation of the financial system will have to go hand in hand with that of the capital account. 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Money base M1 M2
%
 
Figure 12. Monetary aggregates in China (% of GDP). Source: ADB, OECD. 
 
Though working, the maintenance of this strategy has some inherent shortcomings: a) the mounting 
size of sterilization debt required to offset the reserve accumulation; b) the liquidity overhang in the 
banking system induced by the domestic financial repression and asset portfolio distortions; c) the 
currency mismatch between PBC assets and liabilities; d) the growing social and quasi-fiscal costs 
of reserve accumulation; and e) the inability of the monetary authorities to liberalize the domestic 
interest rates in this context. This suggests that PBC reserve accumulation cum sterilization may 
continue as long as three conditions are met: interest rate differentials between UST securities and 
domestic sterilization bills remain favorable, commercial banks’ claims on the central bank do not 









1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Monetary base Total reserves of depository institutions M1 M2
%
 
Figure 13. US monetary aggregates (% of GDP). Source: Federal Reserve System. 
 
In the US, on the contrary, money supply and broad money indicators appear as almost stable over 
time (Figure 13). The credit boom, whose burst led to the current financial turmoil, in fact, is   20 
mainly linked to the liquidity created by the “shadow” banking system (see Brunnermeier, 2009) 
and is not detected by typical monetary aggregate statistics.
37 
 
Growth.  In  the  period  under  scrutiny,  the  US  managed  to  secure  satisfactory  rates  of  growth. 
Certainly, part of this result after the burst of the dot.com bubble was due to the expansion of the 
housing sector, which absorbed most of the new employment, and the increase of house prices, 
which strengthened the perceived wealth of the households. Net exports fell over the period and 
investment  remained  constant:  most  of  the  increase  in  output,  thus,  was  due  to  an  increase  in 
domestic consumption financed by a growing share of US liabilities held in foreign hands. 
The evolution of the Chinese growth is more complex. Figure 14 shows that overall real 
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Figure 14. Contribution to Chinese GDP growth by expenditure. Sources: CEIC data 
 
As other emerging economies, China has expanded faster than the US: real GDP growth exceeded 
8% since 2000, remained above 10% from 2004 to 2007, and lowered to 9% in 2008 because of the 
financial  crisis.  The  decomposition  of  growth  shows  that  China  increasingly  depended  on 
investment and foreign demand: besides adding to domestic demand in a purely statistical term, 
exports also drove investment in the tradable sector up and generated positive spillovers on business 
and consumer confidence. Guo and N’Diaye (2009) estimate that export and investment linked to 
the tradable sector accounted for 60% of GDP growth during 2001-2008, up from 40% in the 1990s. 
The contribution of final consumption to growth, instead, has been somehow muted: the increase in 
domestic saving discussed above has its counterpart in a steady reduction of the share of final 
                                                 
37 The increase in the total reserves of depository institutions and the monetary base in 2008 is the consequence of both 
Fed interventions to reactivate credit and of precautionary reserve hoarding by the depository institutions.   21 
consumption in GDP. The ratio of per capita living expenditure over disposable income in the urban 












Figure 15. Contribution to Chinese real GDP growth by sector. Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China. 
 
Diverse sectors contributed to a different extent to the high Chinese GDP growth (Figure 15).  
The bulk of Chinese growth was and remains concentrated in the secondary sector even though the 
relative importance of the tertiary sector has increased over time. This composition is also reflected 
in the evolution of the sectoral contribution to GDP represented in Figure 16. As in most emerging 
markets, the share of the primary sector in terms of GDP halved from 1995 to 2007, while the share 
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Figure 16. Breakdown of China GDP by sector. Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China. 
The evolution of employment across sectors gives a similar picture (Table 1). Despite a steadily 
growing active population, employment in the primary sector has contracted over the last decade, 
while that in the secondary sector and (even more) the tertiary sector expanded.
38 
                                                 
38 It is worth noting that figures at this level of aggregation likely underestimate the actual dimensions of the trend 
driving employment out of traditional sectors into more advanced activities.    22 
 
   1995  1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
                       
Primary %  52.2  49.8  50.0  50.0  50.0  49.1  46.9  44.8  42.6  40.8  n.a 
Secondary %  23.5  23.5  22.5  22.3  21.4  21.6  22.5  23.8  25.2  26.8  n.a 
Tertiary  %  26.0  26.9  27.5  27.7  28.6  29.3  30.6  31.4  32.2  32.4  n.a 
                       
Employment  680.7  706.4  720.9  730.3  737.4  744.3  752.0  758.3  764.0  769.9  774.8 
Rural 
employment  490.3  490.2  489.3  490.9  489.6  487.9  487.2  484.9  480.9  476.4  472.7 
Urban 
employment  190.4  216.2  231.5  239.4  247.8  256.4  264.8  273.3  283.1  293.5  302.1 
Labor force  688.6  720.9  739.9  744.3  753.6  760.8  768.2  778.8  782.4  786.5  792.4 
                       
Population  1211  1247  1267  1276  1284  1292  1300  1308  1315  1321  1328 
Table 1. Chinese labor statistics (% and million people). Source: ADB and National Bureau of Statistics, China. 
 
Although urban areas employed less than 40% of the Chinese labor force in 2007, almost the entire 
growth in employment materialized in these areas and employment contracted in the rural ones. 
Household consumption followed a similar pattern: the share of expenditure in rural areas passed 
from 30% of total domestic expenditure in 1997 to 21% in 2003 and 18.6% in 2007, whereas the 
share of urban households went from 46% in 1997 to 52% in 2003, and to 54% in 2007 (Table 2).  
 
    1997  2000  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Consumption growth % rate    9.61  10.57  8.03  12.37  12.40  13.06  16.13 
 
Share of household expenditure 
 
76.69  74.54  73.38  73.34  72.80  72.44  71.99 
    of which Urban household    46.42  49.92  52.33  53.18  53.15  53.68  54.04 
    of which Rural household    30.28  24.62  21.05  20.17  19.66  19.08  18.62 
Share of government expenditure    23.30  25.46  26.62  26.66  27.20  27.39  27.93 
Table 2. Consumption growth rate and composition of final expenditure. Source: IFS, ADB 
 
These figures help to appreciate why the Chinese policymakers aim at mobilizing labor from the 
low productive activities in the rural areas into the most productive ones in the urban areas. 
 
Wages. The evolution of nominal wages in China reflects the growth in the economy, the abundant 
supply of unskilled labor and the productivity differentials across sectors. Nominal wages increased 
over time in all sectors, yet less in the primary one (Figure 17). The average rate of growth of wages 
in the whole economy was closely followed by that in manufacturing, while wages in the tertiary 
sector grew at higher rates. As wages in the primary sector lagged behind, they can be treated as 
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Figure 17. Nominal average wages (RMB).  Sources: CEIC 
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Figure 18. Real average wage growth and CPI. Sources: CEIC 
3.  The model  
 
  The world economy includes two countries, the US and China. Three market goods are 
produced in this world economy: an internationally tradable good that is produced in both countries, 
an (internationally) nontradable good that is produced and sold in the US, and an (internationally) 
nontradable  good that is produced and sold in  China. Hence, in both countries there are firms 
specialized  in  the  production  of  tradable  goods  and  firms  specialized  in  the  production  of 
nontradable goods. The tradable good is used as capital in the production of both goods and as 
consumption good, while the nontradable good can be only consumed.
39 Labor is internationally 
immobile but can freely move across sectors within each country. Labor that is not employed in the 
                                                 
39 As argued by Turnovsky (1997), there is no agreed conclusion on the share of tradables and nontradables in total 
investment. For some evidence on the issue, see Bems (2008).   24 
two market sectors is employed in the non-market sector of each country. One can interpret this 
non-market sector as consisting of low-productive activities that people undertake if they cannot be 
employed profitably in the market economy. Goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive. 
Both countries are populated by households that supply labor, buy the consumer goods, accumulate 
financial  assets  and  hold  money.  Moreover,  each  country  has  its  own government  sector.  Two 
policy  regimes  governing  the  world  financial  markets  are  considered.  In  phase  1,  the  Chinese 
authorities  fix  the  nominal  exchange  rate  and  only  official  transactions  in  financial  assets  are 
permitted. The world economy may enter a phase 2 if the Chinese authorities decide to liberalize 
the capital account and to let the nominal exchange rate float consistently with the two countries’ 
policies and market fundamentals. 
  Finally,  time  is  discrete  and  the  time  horizon  is  infinite.  There  is  no  source  of  random 
disturbances and agents’ expectations are rational (in the sense that they are consistent with the true 
processes followed by the relevant variables), thus implying perfect foresight.
40  
 
Firms producing the (internationally) nontradable good 
In each country j, j=us,ch, there is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms, 
which—in each period t—produce the nontradable good YjNt. This good is not storable and must be 
immediately consumed.
41 Firms produce YjNt according to the following technology:  
1 0   , L K A Y j jNt
- 1
jNt jNt jNt
j j < < = g
g g
,                       (1) 
where KjNt and LjNt are, respectively, the capital stock and the labor input used in country j to 
produce the (internationally) nontradable market good YjNt, and AjNt is a variable measuring the 
state  of  technology  of  the  firms  operating  in  that  sector  of  country  j  which  produces  the 
(internationally) nontradable good YjNt. It is assumed that AjNt is a positive function of the capital 
installed in the sector of j which produces YjNt: 
j
jNt jNt K A
g
= .
42 This assumption combines the idea 
that learning-by-doing works through each firm’s capital investment and the idea that knowledge 
and productivity gains spill over instantly across all firms (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Therefore, in accordance with Frankel (1962), it is supposed that although AjNt is endogenous to the 
                                                 
40 The distinction between two main sectors (tradables and nontradables) and the assumption that labor is mobile across 
sectors but not across countries while the capital good is mobile both across sector and countries are consistent with the 
standard trade model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Chapter 4. We extend this framework by introducing a 
technological spillover in both sectors. The latter replaces the assumption of exogenous productivity improvements and 
generates endogenous growth.   
41 Typically, consumer services are consumed while they are produced. 
42 Consistently with this formal set-up, one can interpret technological progress as labor augmenting.   25 
economy, each firm takes it as given, since a single firm’s decisions have only a negligible impact 
on the aggregate stock of capital of the nontradable sector.
43  
  In each t, the net profit (cash flow) pjNt of the representative firm producing nontradables is 
given by: 
pjNt=PjNtYjNt-WjtLjNt-PjTtIjNt, IjNt³0,     (2) 
where PjNt and PjTt are, respectively, the price of the nontradable good and the price of the tradable 
good in country j at time t, Wjt is the nominal wage in country j at time t, and  IjNt is capital 
investment by the representative firm producing nontradables in country j at time t.   
  The capital stock installed in the nontradable sector evolves according to 
KjNt+1=IjNt+(1-δj)KjNt,  0£ δj £1,  KjN0 given.         (3) 
  In each t, firms decide on { }
¥
= + 0 n n jNt L  and { }
¥
= + 0 n n jNt I  subject to (3) in order to maximize 















,                   (4) 
where  1 ) i (1
0
1 s
s jt = + Õ
=
+ , and ijt is the nominal interest rate in country j at time t. 
Firms producing the (internationally) tradable good 
In each country j, there is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical firms producing 
the (internationally) tradable good YjTt. In each period t, these firms produce YjTt according to the 
following technology:  
1 0   , L K A Y j jTt
- 1
jTt jTt jTt
j j < < = a
a a
,                       (5) 
where KjTt and LjTt are, respectively, the capital stock and the labor input used in country j to 
produce the (internationally) tradable market good YjTt, and AjTt is a variable measuring the state of 
technology of the firms operating in that sector of country j which produces the (internationally) 
tradable good YjTt. It is assumed that AjTt is a positive function of the capital installed in the sector 
of j which produces YjTt: 
j
jTt jTt K A
a = . 
  In each t, the net profit pjTt of the representative firm producing tradables is given by 
p jTt=PjTtYjTt-WjtLjTt-PjTtIjTt,    IjTt³0,             (6) 
                                                 
43 This amounts to say that technological progress is endogenous to the economy, although it is an unintended by-
products of firms’ capital investment rather than the result of purposive R&D efforts.   26 
where IjTt is capital investment by the representative firm producing tradables in country j at time t.   
  The capital stock installed in the tradable sector evolves according to 
KjTt+1=IjTt+(1-δj)KjTt,  0£ δj£1,  KjT0 given.        (7) 
  In each t, firms decide on { }
¥
= + 0 n n jTt L  and { }
¥
= + 0 n n jTt I  subject to (7) in order to maximize 















.                   (8) 
Households   
  Households are infinitely lived. Their large number living in country j is normalized to be 
one. Consumption, real money balances providing liquidity services and a public good provided by 
the government enter the period utility function of the representative household of country j, ujt:  
0 '   0,    ), G (
P
M
ln ) C ln( u j jt
jt
jt








+ = v v c c ,            (9) 
where Mjt and Pjt are, respectively, the household’s nominal money holdings and the consumer 
price index in country j at time t, Cjt is the consumption index for the households located in country 
j at time t, and Gjt is the amount of public good provided by the government of country j in t. The 
consumption index is defined as 
1 0    , C C C j
- 1
jTt jNt jt
j j < < = h
h h
,       (10)                                                                                                             
where CjNt and CjTt are, respectively, the  consumption of nontradables  and the  consumption of 
tradables by the  representative household located in country j  at time t. Notice that Cjt can be 
interpreted as a composite good. Given (10), PjNt and PjTt, the consumer price index Pjt is obtained 














h h º = .               (11) 
  The representative household’s period budget constraint is:  
BjHt+1+EjtFjHt+1+Mjt+PjNtCjNt+PjTtCjTt£(1+ijt)BjHt+(1+iit)EjtFjHt+Mjt-1+πjNt+πjTt+LjtWjt-Tjt,      
BjH0, FjH0 and Mj-1 given, i≠j, (12) 
where BjHt are the domestic financial assets accumulated during period t-1 by the representative 
household of country j and carried over into period t with nominal yield ijt, Ejt (Ejt=1/Eit) is the 
nominal exchange rate of country j at time t (the price in units of the j-country’s currency of one   27 
unit of the i-country currency at time t), FjHt are the foreign financial assets (denominated in foreign 
currency) accumulated during period t-1 by the representative household of country j and carried 
over into period t with nominal yield iit, Ljt is the amount of labor supplied by the representative 
household of country j in period t, and Tjt are the net monetary transfers (“net taxes”) from the 
representative  household  of  country  j  to  its  government  in  t.  Notice  that  in  each  period  the 
representative household of country j is entitled to receive the net profits earned by the firms located 
in its own country as dividend payments. It should be also apparent that nominal balances (no-
interest bearing financial assets) Mjt are accumulated during period t and carried over into period 
t+1 because of the liquidity services that they provide to the households. 
  To rule out the possibility that households borrow arbitrary large sums, we impose the usual 
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  The amount of labor supplied by the representative household of country j in period t is 
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jt       (14) 
where  Hj  is  the  fixed  time  endowment  of  each  household  located  in  country  j,  and  Vjt  is  the 
reservation wage for households located in j at time t. One could argue that this reservation wage 
depends on labor productivity in the non-market sector of the economy, which may be interpreted 
as a traditional sector where low-productive technologies are utilized for subsistence consumption
44 
(it can be considered a proxy of China’s primary sector). Thus, it is plausible to assume that Vjt 
evolves according to  
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  (15) 
This amounts to assume that, in any period in which households devote some time to non-market 
activities, some technological progress occurs in the non-market sector because of learning by doing 
(the rate at which labor productivity increases in this sector is exogenously given), while labor 
productivity is stagnant in this sector whenever households devote all their time to market activities. 
  In  each  t,  households  located  in  country  j  decide  on  { }
¥
= + 0 v v jt L ,  { }
¥
= + + 0 v v 1 jHt B , 
{ }
¥
= + + 0 v v 1 jHt F ,{ }
¥
= + 0 v v jt M , { }
¥
= + 0 v v jNt C  and { }
¥
= + 0 v v jTt C  subject to (12), (13) and (14)  in order to 








j 1 0    , u q q ,                 (16) 
where θj represents the subjective discount factor of country j’s households. 
 
Government sectors  
  In  each  period  t,  the  government  of  country  j  produces  the  public  good  Gjt combining 
nontradable and tradable goods according to: 
 Gjt=min(GjNt, ζjGjTt),   ζj>0,                    (17) 
where GjNt and GjTt are, respectively, the quantity of nontradable good and the quantity of tradable 
good that the government of country j buys in t to produce the public good. Since it is assumed that 
the  government  produces  efficiently,  (17)  implies  that  GjNt=ζjGjTt  (the  parameter  ζj  can  be 
interpreted as a purely technological parameter  or as a parameter reflecting the choice that the 
government of country j does concerning the characteristics of the public good that it intends to 
provide).   
  Hence, in each period t, the government of country j has to decide the fraction gjt of the 
country’s GDP to be spent for the production of the public good: 
    PjNtGjNt+PjTtGjTt=gjt(PjNtYjNt+PjTtYjTt),  0£ gjt<1.               (18) 
In each t, the government of country j must satisfy its period budget constraint:  
                     BjGt+1+EjtFjGt+1+gjt(PjNtYjNt+PjTtYjTt)£Mjt-Mjt-1+Tjt+(1+ijt)BjGt+Ejt(1+iit)FjGt,   
BjG0, FjG0 and Mj-1 given,  i≠j,   (19) 
where  BjGt  are  the  domestic  financial  assets  accumulated  during  period  t-1  by  the  j-country’s 
government sector and carried over into period t with nominal yield ijt, and FjGt are the foreign   29 
financial assets (denominated in foreign currency) accumulated during period t-1 by the j-country’s 
government sector and carried over into period t with nominal yield iit.  
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Markets equilibrium conditions 
  Markets for labor and for the nontradable good are purely domestic. Hence, equilibrium in 
these markets requires: 
Ljt=LjNt+LjTt          (21) 
and  
YjNt=CjNt+GjNt.        (22) 
  The market for the tradable good is internationally integrated. Equilibrium in this market 
requires: 
YusTt+YchTt=CusTt+CchTt+GusTt+GchTt+IusNt+IusTt+IchNt+IchTt.        (23) 
  In this internationally integrated market, the one-price law must hold:   
PjTt=EjtPiTt,  i≠j,                     (24) 





jt M M =                      (25) 
  Equilibrium in the world markets for financial assets requires 
 BusHt+BusGt+FchHt+FchGt=0,                     (26) 
and 
    BchHt+BchGt+FusHt+FusGt=0.                      (27) 
 
Policy regimes governing the world financial markets 
  Two phases in the history of the world economy—corresponding to different policy regimes 
governing the world financial markets—are considered.    30 
  Under both regimes, the US authorities decide on fiscal policy and on monetary policy by 
setting  { }
¥




M - M + º m , 
1 - j j q m > .
45 Similarly, the Chinese authorities set { }
¥
=0 t cht g  and  ch m . 
  In phase 1, the Chinese capital account is not liberalized: the only international transactions 
in financial assets that take place are those operated by the Chinese authorities, which decide on 
{ }
-1 * t
0 t cht E = , where t* (t*>0) is the period in which an irreversible regime switch occurs and phase 2 
begins. Consistently, in phase 1, the Chinese authorities let their foreign asset holdings (“foreign 
reserves”) adjust so as to accommodate the flows of funds generated by this mix of policies.
46 In 
other words, phase 1 is characterized by (26), (27), 
FusHt=FusGt=FchHt=0,  t<t*,                         (28) 
and  
) (1 E E E
t
1 s
1 - s ch0 cht cht Õ
=
+ = = e ,  1 ) (1
0
1 s
1 - s = + Õ
=
e , t<t*,                     (29) 
where ch0 E and { }
-2 * t
0 t t = e  are both decided by the Chinese authorities and are, respectively, the level 
of the nominal exchange rate in period 0 and the time profile of the crawl rate of the exchange rate. 
Notice  that  (28)—together  with  (26)  and  (27)—entails  BusHt+BusGt+FchGt=0  and  BchHt+BchGt=0, 
t<t*: the Chinese accumulation of foreign reserves is the counterpart of the US negative net foreign 
asset position, and in phase 1 it is assumed that the Chinese net holdings of domestic assets are 
equal to zero.
47 Hence, in phase 1, China’s foreign reserves evolve according to 
FchGt+1-FchGt=iustFchGt-TAust,  t<t*,                                      (30) 
 where  TAjt≡PjTt(YjTt-CjTt-GjTt-IjNt-IjTt)  is  the  trade  account  of  country  j  (denominated  in  j 
currency)  at  time  t.  By  considering  (26)  and  (28),  one  can  see  that  (30)  can  be  written  as 
                                                 
45 The condition  1 - j j q m >  is necessary for insuring that real money holdings in country j increase asymptotically at 
the same rate as KjTt and KjNt. 
46 By the end of 2007 China almost eliminated controls on capital outflows by industrial corporations and financial 
institutions.  These  latter,  however,  did  not  diversify  by  investing  outside  China  because  of  the  expectations  of 
revaluation  of  the  renmbinbi.  It  follows  that,  by  keeping  the  exchange  rate  at  an  undervalued  level,  the  Chinese 
authorities have de facto preserved a situation of very limited capital flows. Hence, it is reasonable to treat the financial 
account as closed. 
47 Typically,  the  People’s  Bank  of  China  seeks  to  compensate  the  accumulation  of  foreign  reserves  by  selling 
sterilization bills to domestic agents, so as to keep control over money supply. As a result of this kind of operations, it is 
normally the case that the government sector reduces its holdings of domestic assets, while private agents increase 
theirs. However, for our purposes, it is not necessary to model the specific modalities whereby the Chinese central bank 
controls the supply of money while accumulating foreign reserves. What is essential for us is that an increase in the 
government sector’s holdings of foreign assets has its counterpart in an improvement of the country’s trade account.    31 
BusHt+1+BusGt+1=(1+iust)(BusHt+BusGt)+TAust,  t<t*, which is the consolidated (government+private 
sector) balance sheet of the US economy in phase 1: given the Chinese authorities’ willingness to 
accumulate foreign reserves, it is immaterial how the US external debt is divided up according to 
government and private sector net liabilities. 
  In  period  t*,  the  Chinese  authorities  liberalize  the  capital  account  and  let  the  nominal 
exchange rate float consistently with the two countries’ policies and market fundamentals. Hence, 
under this regime, one has the interest-parity condition 
      ) i (1
E
E
) i (1 ust
1 - cht
cht
cht + = + , t³t*.           (31) 
Moreover, in phase 2, the Chinese authorities set the maximum amount of US trade deficit—as a 
fraction ξ of US GDP—that they are willing to finance in each period by maneuvering their foreign 
reserves.
48 Therefore, China’s net foreign asset position (denominated in US currency) evolves in 
phase 2 according to 
FchHt+1+FchGt+1-Eust(FusHt+1+FusGt+1)-[FchHt+FchGt-Eust-1(FusHt+FusGt)]=           
=iust[FchHt+FchGt-Eust-1(FusHt+FusGt)]-TAust,  t³t*,     (32) 
where TAust≥-ξ(PusNtYusNt+PusTtYusTt), ξ≥0, t≥t*. 
Summarizing,  phase  2  is  characterized  by  (26),  (27),  (31)  and  (32),  and  it  is  worth  to 
emphasize that also in this phase the possibility for the US to run a persistent external deficit rests 
ultimately on the Chinese authorities’ willingness to finance it. 
  Finally, it should be stressed that it is up to the Chinese authorities to decide when the 
regime switch has to take place: t* is decided by the Chinese government and known to everybody. 
It is even possible that the regime switch is postponed forever (t*→∞): in this case the Chinese 
authorities never liberalize the capital account and never let the nominal exchange rate float.   
4. Characterization of an equilibrium path 
 
  Using the market equilibrium conditions and solving the agents’ optimization problems (see 
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48 There are alternative ways for setting the limit to the size of the US external deficit that the Chinese authorities are 
willing to finance (for instance, by setting a limit to the US current account deficit as a fraction of China’s GDP). 
However, in a two-country setup it is not relevant how this external constraint imposed on the US is formulated: for 
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.       (43) 
It is easy to verify that equation (33) is derived from the equilibrium condition of the world market 
for the tradable good (23) by using (5) and (7). Equations (34) and (35) give us the amounts of 
tradables that are purchased in equilibrium, respectively, by the households and by the government 
of  country  j.  Equation  (36)  governs  the  equilibrium  trajectory  of  the  ratio  between  the  capital 
installed in the US tradable sector and that installed in the Chinese tradable sector (consistently with 
the stylized facts, it is reasonable to assume that at time 0 this ratio is relatively large, surely larger 
than  one).
50 Equation  (37)  shows—together  with  (38)—that  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  capital 
installed in the tradable sector of country j depends in any t>0 on the quantities of labor that j 
devotes to the production of tradables and nontradables both in t and in t+1. In (38), one can see the 
relationship linking, in each country j, the evolution of the capital installed in the nontradable sector 
to that of the capital installed in the tradable sector. Notice that the rate of growth of the capital 












+ + + = r . In (39), one can check that the possibility for country j to employ all its 
labor in the two market sectors of the economy depends crucially on its endowments of capital in 
both  sectors  relatively  to  its  reservation  wage  (again,  consistently  with  the  stylized  facts,  it  is 
reasonable to assume that at time 0 China employs some of its labor in the traditional sector of the 
economy, while in no period this is the case for the US). The law of motion of the ratio in country j 
between  the  reservation  wage  and  the  capital  installed  in  the  tradable  sector  is  given  by  (40). 
Equation (41) is derived from the one-price law (24) and gives the equilibrium level of the nominal 
                                                 
49 Along an equilibrium path, the real rate of interest,  1 -
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50 It should be noticed that KjTt and KjNt can be considered as, respectively, the stock of capital per household in the 
tradable sector of country j and the stock of capital per household in the nontradable sector of country j.    34 
exchange rate of country j. In equation (42), one has the equilibrium level of the nominal interest 
rate in country j, which is constant since the rate of money growth is fixed in both countries. Finally, 
equation (43) gives the equilibrium level of the trade account of country j.  
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,  0£t<t*.                  (44) 
One can easily see from (44) that in phase 1—by keeping their currency undervalued with respect to 
the US currency—the Chinese authorities compress the Chinese consumption of tradables relatively 
to that of the US (this compression of the Chinese consumption of tradables is consistent with the 
stylized facts documented in section 2). By using (34), (38) and (39) for substituting CjTt, KjNt and 
LjNt, one can also verify that in phase 1 equation (44) defines implicitly the level of employment in 
the US tradable sector as a function of LchTt, LchNt, Zt, gcht, gust, , Echt us m  and  ch m . 
) , , E , g , g , Z , L , L ( L ch us cht ust cht t chNt chTt usTt m m e = ,       0<t<t*.
51       (45) 
 Given the time profile of the nominal exchange rate set by the Chinese authorities, in phase 1 
monetary policies in US and in China can affect the dynamics of the real variables. This is not the 
case in phase 2: monetary policies have no effect on real variables. In phase 2, indeed, the relation 
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= = l ,   t³t*.                        (46)       
5.   Growth dynamics under different policy regimes 
 
    We examine the growth dynamics of the world economy under the hypothesis that at time 0 
China—differently than the US—employs some of its labor in the low-productive sector of the 
economy. This amounts to assume that the initial endowments KchT0 and KchN0 are relatively low 
with respect to Vch0, while the US has larger initial stocks of capital per household with respect to 
Vus0 (see (37)).  
  We  consider  three  possible  scenarios  for  the  world  economy  depending  on  the  policies 
pursued by the Chinese authorities:  
                                                 
51 At time 0, the level of employment in the US tradable sector depends also on the initial endowments of capital KchT0, 
KusT0, KchN0 and KusN0.   35 
(A) The Chinese authorities adopt a combination of fiscal policy and exchange-rate pegging which 
allows China to absorb all its manpower in the market sectors of the economy. As soon as this 
objective is reached, they fully liberalize the capital account and let the exchange rate float.  
(B) The Chinese authorities fully liberalize the capital account and let the exchange rate float even 
if China has not yet succeeded in absorbing all its manpower in the market sectors of the economy.  
(C) The Chinese authorities never liberalize the capital account and never let the exchange rate float 
(t*→∞). As a result, in period t°>0 China succeeds in absorbing all its manpower in the market 
sectors of the economy. 
5.1 Scenario A 
  In  this  case,  the  equilibrium  trajectory  of  the  real  variables  of  the  world  economy  is 
governed for t³t* by two difference equations in LchTt and Zt (see the Appendix): 
0 ) g , L , L ( ) g , L , L ( Z ) g , g , Z , L , L ( ch chTt 1 chTt us chTt 1 chTt t ch us t chTt 1 chTt = + = Y + + + y b , t³t*,  (47)    
     0 ) g , g , Z , L , Z , L ( ch us t chTt 1 t 1 chTt = L + + , t³t*,                            (48) 
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a x , t³t*.      (49) 
Equations (47) and (48) are obtained, respectively, from (33) and (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38), 
(39) (with  usTt us usNt L   - H L =  and  chTt ch chNt L   - H L = ) and (46), where for simplicity and without loss of 
generality it is assumed that  us ust g g =  and  * t t g g    ch cht ³ " = . The inequality (49) reflects the limit 
imposed  on  US  policies  by  the  Chinese  willingness  to  finance  the  US  external  deficit,  where 
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l l . 
  Some propositions concerning long-run growth hold in Scenario A. 
 
Proposition  1  The asymptotic rate of real GDP growth of country j increases with LjT, where 
jTt t jT  L lim L
¥ ® =  is the asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in the tradable sector of country j.   
Proof:  If  LjTt→LjT  as  t→∞,  then  the  country  j’s  rate  of  real  GDP  growth  approaches 
] - 1 L ) - (1 [ j jT j j j
j d a q r
a + = , where   jt
t
j   lim r r
¥ ®







                                                 
52 As shown in the Appendix, LjTt→LjT as t→∞ implies that  jt
t jt GDP
t
  lim   lim r r
¥ ® ¥ ®
= .   36 
  Proposition 1 is a consequence of the fact that the long-run rate of real GDP growth is a 
function of the marginal productivity of capital in the production of tradables, since the production 
process of all market sectors of the economy requires capital goods that are typically tradables (e.g. 
equipment  and  machinery),  and  technological  progress  is  driven  by  the  accumulation  and 
installment of capital.  
Proposition 2 Asymptotically, the real GDP of the country whose households are less impatient, 
say China (θch>θus), grows at a higher rate. Moreover, the asymptotic rate of real growth of both 
countries depends on the fiscal policy of the country that tends to grow faster in the long run (say 
China), while it is independent of the fiscal policy of the country growing slower in the long run 
(say the US).   
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+ = + , thus implying that  us ch r r > since θch>θus. Moreover, 
if θch>θus, then LchT is a function of αch, γch, ηch, θch, δch, Hch, ζch and  ch g  (see the Appendix), thus 
making  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ ch
ch
chT ch ch ch
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+ =  dependent  on  ch g  but  independent  of  the  structural  and 
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+ = + , one 
has  that  LusT  is  a  function  of  αus,  δus,  αch,  γch,  ηch,  θch,  δch,  Hch,  ζch  and  ch g ,  thus  making 
] - 1 ) - (1 [ us
us
usT us us usi
j d a q r
a
+ =  dependent on  ch g  but independent of  us g . 
  Proposition 2 implies that if we treat the US as the relatively impatient country (θus<θch), 
consistently with the evidence in favor of a lower propensity to save for US households relative to 
their European and Asian counterparts (see Ghironi et al., 2008), we should expect higher long-run 
real growth in China than in the US and Z=0, where  t t Z   lim Z
¥ ® = . Moreover, if θus<θch, we should 
expect that in the long run the performance of the Chinese economy will not be affected by the 
performance of the US economy, while the latter will be affected by the Chinese structural and 
policy parameters, since the size of the US economy will become negligible as t→∞ relative to the 
size of the Chinese economy.  
Proposition 3 The asymptotic rate of real growth increases in both countries with the fraction of 
GDP  devoted  to  the  provision  of  the  public  good  by  the  country  whose  households  are  less 
impatient if the public good is produced in this country (say China) by using a relatively small 
proportion of nontradable good, i.e., if its ζch is below a critical threshold  ch z  depending on αch, γch, 
ηch, θch, δch and Hch. The opposite is true if ζch is relatively large: if  ch ch z z > , a larger fraction of 
GDP spent for producing the public good in China (that is a larger  ch g ) depresses long-run real   37 
growth in both countries. If ζch is close to  ch z , a change in  ch g  has little effect on long-run real 
growth (in the special case in which  ch ch z z = , a change in  ch g  does not affect long-run real growth 
in any country). 
  Proof: See the Appendix. 
  Long-run real growth in the two countries is sensitive to both the fraction of GDP devoted to 
public  expenditures  and  the  composition  of  public  expenditures  (the  mix  of  tradables  and 
nontradables purchased by the government) in the country whose households are less impatient (say 
China). In particular, if θus<θch, we should expect that both ρus and ρch are boosted by a larger  ch g  if 
and only if the Chinese government dedicates a relatively large fraction of its expenditure to the 
purchase of tradables. This result reflects the fact that fiscal policy can affect the composition of 
aggregate  demand  and  shift  domestic  production  towards  the  sector  producing  tradables,  thus 
feeding  long-run  growth  (see  Proposition  1).  Finally,  notice  that—as  ζch  is  very  close  to  the 
threshold  ch z —changes in China’s fiscal policy have very little effect on long-run real growth. 
Proposition  4  If  θch>θus,  one  has  0 ta  ta lim ch cht t = =
¥ ® ,  where 
) Y P Y (P
TA
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asymptotically, the trade account becomes a negligible component of the GDP of China, namely of 
the country that exhibits higher real growth in the long run.  
Proof:  By  evaluating  equation  (47)  as  t→∞,  one  can  easily  verify  that  0 Z   lim t t =
¥ ®  entails 
0  ta lim cht t =
¥ ® . 
  The intuition behind this result should be straightforward: as t→∞, the size of the economy 
growing slower in the long run—which is (in the model!) the only trading partner of China—
becomes negligible relative to the size of the country growing faster. Hence, any trade between 
them tends to become insignificant relative to China’s GDP. This is not necessarily the case for the 
US, i.e., the country growing slower in the long run: 0 ta lim ta ust t us
³
< =
¥ ® .                                                
  It is worth to emphasize that the model leaves open the possibility that China’s authorities 
are willing to finance a permanent US current account deficit (ξ>0), thus accumulating foreign 
reserves forever. In this way, our model captures an important feature of the world economy under 
analysis, namely that if the authorities of one country are willing to let their country increase its net 
foreign asset position forever, the other country can face a softened intertemporal budget constraint. 
In  other  words,  it  is  possible  that  the  world  economy  moves  along  an  equilibrium  path  such 
that -¥ ® ust nfa  as t→∞, where  j i   ,
Y P Y P
) F (F - )  F (F E
nfa
jTt jTt jNt jNt




º , is the country j’s ratio   38 
between  its  net  foreign  asset  position  (denominated  in  domestic  currency  and  evaluated  at  the 
beginning of t) and its nominal GDP.
53    
  Even if the net flow of resources that would be necessary to finance the US current account 
deficit approaches asymptotically zero as a proportion of China’s GDP, one may wonder why the 
Chinese authorities should possibly let their country’s net foreign asset position increase forever, 
thus allowing the US to undertake policies conducive to a permanent external deficit. As a matter of 
fact,  indeed,  the  asymptotic  performance  of  the  Chinese  economy  will  not  be  affected  by  the 
policies  undertaken  by  the  US  authorities  (recall  our  comment  to  Proposition  2).  However,  a 
possible rationale for a Chinese benign attitude towards a persistent US external deficit can be 
found in the performance of the Chinese economy along the transitional path, which is affected by 
the US policies.  
For studying the transitional path along which the world economy moves from period t* 
onwards in Scenario A, we linearize the system (47)-(48) around (LchT, Z=0) under the assumption 
that θch>θus. The linearized system thus obtained has only one path converging to (LchT, Z=0), 
which is governed by  
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where all the partial derivatives 
t Z Y , 
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L are evaluated at (LchT, Z=0) 
















































 (see  the 
Appendix). Considering (50), this implies that—along the transitional path—LchTt>LchT if and only 
if taus<0. In particular, if taus<0, then LchTt*>LchT, thus favoring the accumulation of capital and the 
                                                 
53 Country  j’s  net  foreign  asset  position-GDP  ratio  evolves  according  to 
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: since the long-run rate of growth of country j’s nominal GDP 
is lower than its nominal rate of interest, country j’s external debt (or, possibly, its positive net foreign asset position) 
tends in the long run to increase faster that its nominal GDP even if  0 ta lim jt
t
=
¥ ® .      39 
employment of the entire Chinese manpower in the high-productive sectors of the economy.
54 In 
this situation, the Chinese authorities should be interested in convincing market participants of their 
willingness  to  finance  the  US  external  deficit  also  in  the  future.  Notice  that  this  implicit 
commitment can be considered credible, in the light of the fact that if at some t’>t* the Chinese 
authorities abruptly ceased to accumulate US assets, thus forcing the US authorities to implement 
an unanticipated permanent change in fiscal policy aimed at reducing absorption, there would be a 
remarkable fall in the labor employed in the Chinese tradable sector.
55 As a likely consequence of 
this fall, a fraction of the Chinese workforce would be again expelled from the high-productive 
sectors of the economy. One could argue that under these circumstances the Chinese authorities 
might well change the fraction of GDP devoted to public expenditure so as to compensate the 
permanent  decrease  in  foreign  demand  for  tradables.  However,  as  one  can  conclude  from  our 
comment to Proposition 3, fiscal policy could be very ineffective in doing so. 
  In phase 1, the Chinese nominal exchange rate is kept undervalued so as to maintain the 
Chinese tradables relative cheap with respect to the US tradables. As Zt decreases, that is as China 
reduces its gap relatively to the US in terms of capital per household in the tradable sector, the 
Chinese authorities let their currency gradually appreciate, but preserving the price competitiveness 
of the Chinese tradables relatively to the US tradables. This policy amounts to set 
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= ,  0£t<t*,        (53) 
where Q is a constant whose value is decided by the Chinese authorities (it measures the degree of 
“aggressiveness” of the mercantilist strategy adopted by the Chinese authorities in phase 1: a larger 
Q means that—other things being equal—the Chinese currency is maintained more undervalued 
with respect to the US currency). Given (36) and (44), the policy rule (52)-(53) allows us to write 
(45) as 
                                                 
54 With regard to period t*-1, one can check by considering (34) and (37)-(40) that  0
L * chTt
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55 This  can  be  seen  by  considering  that,  if  the  world  economy  were  moving  along  an  equilibrium  path  such  that 




and at t’>t* the US authorities implemented an unanticipated fiscal adjustment consistent with 




,  the Chinese workforce employed in the tradable sector—which was  chT chTt'-1 L L >  (see equation 
(50))—would fall immediately at  chT chTt' L L = .    40 
  0    ), Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , L , L ( L Q us ch chNt chTt usTt < = f f ,    0<t<t*,
56           (54) 
where also in phase 1 we assume for simplicity and without loss of generality that fiscal policies do 
not change ( ch cht g ˆ g =  and  * t t    g ˆ g us ust < " = ). 
  The equilibrium trajectory of the real variables is governed in phase 1 by three difference 
equations in LchTt, Ncht and Zt (see the Appendix):  
t*, t 0    , 0 ) g ˆ , N , L , N , (L                                                              
  ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , N , L , N , (L Z ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , Z , N , L , N , L (
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+ + + +
J
V
(55)    
     0 ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , N , Z , L , N , Z , L ( ch us cht t chTt 1 cht 1 t 1 chTt = F + + + , 0<t<t*,             (56) 
0 ) g ˆ , N , L , N , L ( ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt = Q + + , 0<t<t*.
57                             (57) 
Equations (55) and (56) are derived, respectively, from (33) and (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38), 
(39)  (with  usTt us usNt  L - H L =  and  chTt ch chTt cht
chTt
chNt
chNt L - H L , N ,
K
K






= L )  and  (54).  Equation 
(57)  is  derived  from  (40)  by  using  (34),  (35),  (37),  (38)  and  (39)  (again,  with 
chTt ch chTt cht
chTt
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= L ).  
  From  (55)-(57)  we  have  that  Q  (the  degree  of  aggressiveness  of  the  mercantilist  policy 
undertaken  by  the  Chinese  authorities)  affects  the  dynamics  of  the  real  variables.  Moreover, 
equations (42) and (52)-(53) show that having decided on Q the Chinese authorities can still choose 
their preferred combination of (equilibrium) level of the nominal interest rate and level (and time 
profile) of the nominal exchange rate: given  us m  (the US rate of nominal money growth), there is a 
continuum of combinations of  ch m  and  cht E  that are consistent with a given Q. Similarly, if the US 
authorities implement a more (less) inflationary monetary policy by setting a higher (lower)  us m , 
the Chinese authorities may keep the dynamics of the real variables and their nominal interest rate 
unchanged by fixing their nominal exchange rate at a lower (higher) level and letting it appreciate at 
a higher (lower) rate. 
  The fact that in phase 1 the dynamics of the world economy depends also on Ncht reflects the 
presence in China during this phase of some labor which is not employed in the advanced sectors of 
the economy. In Scenario A,  however, the combination of exchange-rate pegging and fiscal policy 
                                                 
56 At time 0, the level of employment in the US tradable sector depends also on the initial endowments of capital KchT0, 
KusT0, KchN0 and KusN0. 
57 At time 0, the dynamics of the economy depends also on the initial endowments of capital KchT0, KusT0, KchN0 and 
KusN0 (see the Appendix).   41 
adopted by the Chinese authorities manages to raise LchTt so as to reach in period t* the objective to 
employ the entire Chinese manpower in the two advanced sectors of the economy. Entering phase 2 
and abandoning the exchange-rate pegging, it is crucial for the Chinese authorities that fiscal policy 
be an effective instrument for sustaining growth and maintaining ch chTt chNt H L L = + .  
5.2 Scenario B 
  In  this  case,  the  equilibrium  trajectory  of  the  real  variables  of  the  world  economy  is 
governed for t³t* by three difference equations in LchTt, Ncht and Zt (see the Appendix): 
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     0 ) g , N , L , N , L ( ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt = G + + , t³t*,                         (59) 
0 ) g , g , N , Z , L , N , Z , L ( ch us cht t chTt 1 cht 1 t 1 chTt = S + + + , t³t*,            (60) 
where  ) g , L , L ( us chTt 1 chTt+ b  must satisfy (49).  
Equations (58) and (60) are obtained, respectively, from (33) and (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38), 
(39)  (with  usTt us usNt  L - H L =  and  chTt ch chTt cht
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(59)  is  derived  from  (40)  by  using  (34),  (35),  (37),  (38)  and  (39)  (again,  with 
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= L ). 
  If  we  keep  treating  the  US  as  the  relatively  impatient  country  (θus<θch),  the  following 
proposition concerning long-run growth holds in Scenario B: 
Proposition 5 If θch>θus, the asymptotic growth rate of China’s real GDP is equal to wch, i.e., the 
rate at which labor productivity increases in the Chinese traditional sector. Moreover, the US real 
GDP grows asymptotically at a rate lower than wch.  
Proof: If LjTt→LjT and Ncht→Nch as t→∞, then the country j’s rate of real GDP growth approaches 
] - 1 L ) - (1 [ j jT j j j
j d a q r
a + = , where  jt
t
j N   lim N
¥ ®
=  (see the Appendix). Moreover, by inspecting (40) 










r = = ,  thus entailing  ch ch us w r r = <  and Zt→0 as t→∞.   
  According to Proposition 5, in this scenario in which a portion of China’s manpower is 
entrapped  in  the  low-productive  sector  of  the  economy,  the  long-run  rate  of  growth  of  both   42 
countries depends on the pace at which productivity increases in the Chinese low-productive sector. 
This is a consequence of the fact that in Scenario B the long-run evolution of the real wages in the 
advanced sectors of China—the country that tends to grow faster—reflects the dynamics of labor 
productivity in the low-productive sector of the economy.  
To verify whether this scenario can be plausible, we study the transitional path along which 
the world economy moves from period t* onwards in Scenario B. By linearizing the system (58)-
(60) around (LchT, Nch, Z=0) under the assumption that θch>θus, one can verify for reasonable sets 
of structural and policy parameter values that (LchT, Nch, Z=0) is unstable (see the Appendix). Only 
in the case in which the policy makers manage to control the economy so as to enter phase 2 with  
* t 23 ch * cht Z q N - N = , the system can converge asymptotically to (LchT, Nch, Z=0) along the path 
governed by  
t*,     t , Z q L ~ * t - t
3 * t 13 chTt ³ = j                                       (61) 
t*,      t , Z q N - N N ~ * t - t
3 * t 23 ch cht cht ³ = º j                     (62) 
t*, t            , Z Z * t - t
3 * t t ³ = j                                (63) 
where  q13  and  q23  are  eigenvectors—and  j3  (0<j3<1)  is  the  only  stable  eigenvalue—of  the 
linearized system (see the Appendix). However, even in this case, a perturbation may easily lead the 
economy to diverge from (LchT, Nch, Z=0), if it causes  t 23 ch cht Z q N - N ¹  at some t>t*, thus moving 
the economy away from the trajectory governed by (61)-(63). This intrinsic instability reflects the 
fact that a shock determining an increase (decrease) in the Chinese reservation wage relatively to 
the stocks of capital accumulated in the Chinese and in the US tradable sector can make the Chinese 
tradable  sector  less  (more)  profitable,  thus  depressing  (boosting)  employment  and  capital 
investment in this sector. As a result, capital accumulation and growth in China’s tradable sector 
decelerates (accelerates), and the effects of the initial shock are amplified. 
  It is legitimate to wonder why the Chinese policy makers may end up in this situation, where 
the  economy  is  intrinsically  unstable  and  a  portion  of  the  workforce  is  entrapped  in  the  low-
productive sectors of the economy. Indeed, this scenario is the consequence of a regime switch 
which takes place too early, or in a context where the fiscal policy cannot adequately offset the 
decrease in the demand for tradables brought about by the appreciation of the Chinese currency that 
follows the full liberalization of the  capital  account and the  end of the exchange-rate pegging. 
Possibly  under  pressure  of  the  US  or  to  alleviate  the  excessive  compression  of  domestic 
consumption due to the persistent undervaluation of the exchange rate, the Chinese policy makers 
may decide to abandon the export-led growth strategy pursued in phase 1 without having a valid 
alternative strategy, especially if fiscal policy has little effect on growth because of its composition.   43 
  Finally, note that also in Scenario B—as in Scenario A—the equilibrium path of the world 
economy is characterized for 0<t<t* by (55)-(57).   
5.3 Scenario C 
 
  In  this  case,  the  equilibrium  trajectory  of  the  real  variables  of  the  world  economy  is 
governed for t³t° by two difference equations in LchTt and Zt (see the Appendix): 
, t   t , 0 ) g ˆ , L , (L ) Q , g ˆ , L , (L Z ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , Z , L , L ( ch chTt 1 chTt us chTt 1 chTt t ch us t chTt 1 chTt ° ³ = + = P + + + o s   (64)    
     0 ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , Z , L , Z , L ( ch us t chTt 1 t 1 chTt = C + + , t³t°,                            (65) 
where from period t°>0 onwards China employs its entire manpower in the advanced sectors of the 
economy. Equations (64) and (65) are obtained, respectively, from (33) and (36) by using (34), (35), 
(37), (38), (39) (with  usTt us usNt  L - H L =  and  chTt ch chNt  L - H L = ) and (54). It is significant that—in this 
scenario—long-run growth depends also on Q, namely on the exchange-rate policy conducted by 
the Chinese authorities.   
  Proposition 1 holds even in Scenario C. In contrast, it is not necessarily the case in Scenario 
C that the country whose households are less impatient exhibits the higher asymptotic rate of real 
GDP growth. However, the following propositions concerning long-run growth hold in Scenario C:  
Proposition 6 The asymptotic rate of China’s real GDP growth is higher than the US asymptotic 
rate of real GDP growth if China’s exchange rate is maintained sufficiently undervalued, i.e., if 
Q Q > , where the threshold Qdepends on the structural and policy parameters of the two countries 
(αch, αus, γch, γus, ηch, ηus, θch, θus, δch, δus, Hch, Hus, ζch, ζus,  ch g ˆ  and  us g ˆ ). 
Proof: See the Appendix.   
Proposition 7 If the asymptotic rate of real GDP growth is higher in China than in the US, i.e., if 
Q Q > , a higher Q depresses US long-run growth without increasing China’s long-run growth. 
Proof: If  Q Q > , then  LchT is a function of αch, γch, ηch, θch, δch, Hch, ζch and  ch g ˆ  (see the proof of 
Proposition 6 in the Appendix), thus making  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ ch chT ch ch ch
ch d a q r
a + =  independent of Q, 
where  jTt
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,  thus  implying  that 
] - 1 L ) - (1 [ us usT us us us
us d a q r
a + =  is decreasing in Q.  
  Two points should be stressed regarding the previous propositions. First, the pegging of the 
exchange rate by the Chinese authorities may not be necessary to insure that the asymptotic rate of 
real GDP growth is higher in China than in the US: the structural and policy parameters of the two 
countries may  be sufficient to guarantee higher  long-run  growth in China, without the need of   44 
keeping its exchange rate artificially undervalued. Second, once that the asymptotic rate of growth 
is higher in China than in the US, a more aggressive exchange-rate policy by the Chinese authorities 
has no effect on China’s long-run growth: again, the contribution of the US demand for tradables to 
China’s  growth  tends  to  become  irrelevant  as  the  size  of  the  US  economy  tends  to  become 
negligible  relative  to  the  size  of  the  Chinese  economy.  Also  in  Scenario  C,  however,  the 
performance of the Chinese economy along the transitional path is affected by  ust
t
us ta lim ta
¥ ®
= .   
For studying the transitional path along which the world economy moves from period t° 
onwards in Scenario C, we linearize the system (64)-(65) around (LchT, Z=0) under the assumption 
that  Q Q > . The linearized system thus obtained has only one path converging to (LchT,  Z=0), 
which is governed by  
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where all the partial derivatives 
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 (see  the 
Appendix). Considering (66), this implies that—along the transitional path—LchTt>LchT if and only 
if taus<0. The same remarks made while commenting Scenario A on the reasons that may motivate 
the Chinese authorities to finance a permanent US trade deficit applies here.   
  Finally, note that in Scenario C the equilibrium path of the world economy is characterized 
for 0<t<t° by (55)-(57). 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this work, we develop a two-country two-stage growth model capturing the relationship 
that has emerged in the last few years between the US and China and the different policy objectives 
of the authorities in these countries. The Chinese leaders maintain a competitive (i.e., undervalued) 
exchange rate so as to sustain China’s exporting sectors and to absorb part of rural workers into the 
industrial sectors. The US policy-makers, instead, are supposedly more concerned with keeping   45 
high the consumption possibilities of the population. As the continuation of the Chinese growth 
strategy entails some costs, a regime change may occur in the future. 
Our  paper  models  the  Sino-American  relationship  and  allows  for  a  comparison  among 
alternative policies that the Chinese authorities may adopt to modify their growth strategy in the 
medium  and  long-term.  We  envisage  three  possible  scenarios  for  the  evolution  of  the  Sino-
American relationship. All the scenarios share phase 1, resembling what has actually occurred in 
recent years, but differ in accordance with what fiscal policy the Chinese authorities adopt, and 
whether and when China fully liberalizes its capital account and floats the currency (thus starting 
phase 2).  
Scenario  A  is  quite  optimistic  because  it  assumes  that  the  structural  parameters  of  the 
Chinese economy are such that fiscal policy can be effective in partially substituting the mercantilist 
policy undertaken in phase 1 as a fundamental source of demand for tradables and as an engine of 
growth.  The  evolution  of  the  US  current  account  turns  out  to  be  determined  by  the  structural 
features  of  the  economies  and,  more  interestingly,  by  the  ultimate  willingness  of  the  Chinese 
authorities  to  finance  its  external  deficits.  Scenario  B  emphasizes  the  risks  for  the  Chinese 
authorities of abandoning the pegging too early: although allowing for larger domestic consumption 
in the short run, they depress long-run growth and maintain some of the labor force entrapped in the 
traditional sector of the economy if their fiscal policy is little effective in substituting exports as a 
source of demand for Chinese tradables. Finally, Scenario C shows that a Chinese continuation of 
the export-led growth strategy based on the exchange rate pegging can be economically feasible, 
but has both pros and cons: on the one hand, it would be conducive to high rates of growth and to 
the absorption of the Chinese manpower into the advanced sectors of the economy; on the other 
hand, Chinese domestic consumption would remain compressed and reserves would expand further.  
A peculiar feature of our model is its ability to account both for the possible differential 
between the asymptotic rates of real GDP growth of the two countries and for the possibility that 
the country growing slower in the long run (the US in the model) faces a “soft” intertemporal 
budget constraint because of the willingness of the other country’s authorities to keep on financing 
its current account deficits. Under this respect, what really matters, from the model’s standpoint, is 
the consolidated (government sector + private sector) balance sheet of the US economy, which has 
to  remain  within  the  limits  imposed  by  the  Chinese  authorities’  willingness  to  finance  the  US 
deficits. This has important policy implications: the model suggests that the current US policies 
seeking  to  support  domestic  demand  by  directly  or  indirectly  transforming  private  debt  into 
government  debt,  do  not  affect  the  fundamental  constraint  faced  by  the  US  economy.  This   46 
constraint depends, rather, on the extent to which China (as well as the other countries running a 
current account surplus) is willing to continue financing the US deficits.  
At the Global Think-tank Summit held in Beijing on July 3, 2009, the PBC Governor, Mr 
Zhou Xiaouchuan, discussed a number of plausible ways for rebalancing the global economy and 
called for further research on the issue. Our work is a contribution in this direction as we discuss 
plausible  prospective  paths  of  the  US-China  co-dependency  as  well  as  their  implications.  In 
particular,  we  show  that  not  all  the  scenarios  may  comply  with  the  desiderata  of  the  Chinese 
authorities. The maintenance of the current Sino-American co-dependency (our scenario C) does 
ensure the absorption of the entire Chinese labor force into the highly productive sectors of the 
economy,  but  it  requires  a  persistently  subdued  level  of  consumption  and  the  sterilization  of 
growing  amounts  of  foreign  reserves.  In  its  turn,  to  achieve  the  authorities’  objectives  the 
liberalization of the exchange rate and of the capital account in China needs to be timely and to be 
accompanied by an adequate change in the government’s fiscal policy (like in scenario A); either a 
premature switch or an inadequate fiscal policy after the regime change (as in scenario B) may 
prevent the absorption of all Chinese workers into the most advanced sectors of the economy. 
  Some  general  questions  are  raised  by  our  analysis.  To  what  extent  can  China’s  public 
expenditure be considered a plausible candidate for substituting export as a source of demand for 
the tradable sector of the economy? For how long will the Chinese people accept the compression 
of domestic consumption brought about by the mercantilist policy undertaken by their leadership? 
Would the US accept to reduce its relevance in the world economy by allowing China to overtake it 
by size thanks to the fast growth made possible by this export-led strategy?   
  For the sake of clarity and to keep the model more tractable, we deliberately neglect three 
aspects which represent avenues for future research. First, we do not model the private financial 
sector in the US and the financially repressed banking system in China (see Song et al., 2009). 
Second,  we  focus  our  attention  on  two  countries,  thereby  leaving  aside  i)  the  interconnections 
between China and other Asian countries;
58 ii) the role of the Euro area (see Bonatti, 2006 on the 
US-EU relationship); iii) the role of the oil exporting countries and of oil prices; iv) the problems 
linked to geographical distribution of output and consumption within China (tackled for instance by 
Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006); and v) the growth of global imbalances in the 1990s, when China 
was still a marginal player in the world economy (see Hunt and Rebucci, 2005 on this). Finally, our 
                                                 
58 While some emerging Asian economies can be reasonably treated as similar and assimilated to China, one should 
recall  that  most  of  Chinese  exports  are  due  to  processing  trade  and  appear  as  the  result  of  the  development  of 
international production networks.    47 
model does not address FDI and portfolio flows
59: modeling both of them would be useful to reflect 
the whole amount of resources intermediated by the Chinese central bank, but would also require a 
fully-fledged  portfolio  model  at  the  cost  of  reducing  our  ability  to  highlight  the  real  (i.e.  non 
financial) aspects of the global imbalances.
60  
We also reckon that the uninterrupted expansion of global imbalances was strictly related to two 
other US-specific ‘pathological’ phenomena, that is the housing and credit booms.
61 These latter, 
though certainly not independent from global imbalances
62, depended also on other factors internal 
to  the  US,  such  as  the  unusually  expansionary  stance  of  US  economic  authorities  and  the 
unprecedented level of leverage of the private sector. In evaluating the merits and the prospects of 
the Sino-American co-dependency, we abstracted from these and other US “excesses”, as well as 
from the extraordinary efforts the US authorities have endured to push internal demand and bail out 
the US financial system after the crisis erupted. As to China, some of the explanations offered to 
account for the large Chinese current account surpluses are not modeled either; for instance, the 
demographic  evolution  of  the  Chinese  population  and  the  precautionary  private  saving  motive 
linked to the alleged absence of adequate social security are not directly considered.
63 
Finally, we maintain the existence of a positive impact of export-led production growth on 
employment in the tradable sector, even though we acknowledge that this impact may be decreasing 
over  time  because  of  productivity  gains  (such  as  those  due  to  capital  accumulation  and  to  the 
Denison effect).
64 
                                                 
59 Lipschitz et al. (2009), on the contrary, develop a model to account for the Chinese transitional growth which focuses 
on FDI-related capital flows and neglects the factors explaining the accumulation of reserves. 
60 For papers modeling international capital flows, see, inter alia, Albuquerque et al. (2007), Blanchard et al. (2005), 
Caballero et al. (2008), Courdacier et al. (2008), Dedola and Straub (2007), Devereux and Sutherland (2007,2008, 
2009), Evans and Hnatkovska (2007), and Tille and Van Wincoop (2007). 
61 Palley (2006) and Ferguson and Schularick (2007) identify the limits of the BWII model in the growing US financial 
fragility and in the undermining of its manufacturing (tradable) sector. Forbes (2008), while finding empirical support 
for the primary role of the US financial system for developing countries in the past, argues that this is likely to fade in 
the future when emerging countries will strengthen their financial systems, and the US assets and markets will lose part 
of their perceived advantages (in terms of liquidity, safety and depth). The crucial issue behind this plausible scenario, 
as Calvo and Talvi (2006) and Krugman (2007) pointed out,  remains ‘when’ the US will loose its attractiveness. 
62 Ferguson and Schularick (2007) agree on the BWII characterization proposed by Dooley and co-authors (and dub 
US-China relationship as Chimerica), yet warn that the acceleration, the duration and the extent of the imbalances have 
fed global asset price imbalances that in turn undermine the macro-financial mechanism underlying their formation. 
63 See Ma and Zhou (2009) on the impact of demographics on the Chinese net foreign asset position. 
64 Feenstra and Hong (2007) argue that, between 1997 and 2005, export-led growth  may explain at  most 30% of 
employment gains in China while the majority is due to gains in the nontradable sector. This is because a great share of 
Chinese exports involves assembled products (i.e., processing trade). While Rodrik (2006b) and Schott (2008) argue 
that  Chinese  exports  exhibit  a  higher  level  of  sophistication  with  respect  to  those  of  similar  emerging  markets, 
Branstetter and Lardy (2006), Amiti and Freund (2009) and Athukorala (2009) show that this is due to the processing 
exports even in the high-tech sectors. Being the relative importance of processing exports as it may, we argue that there   48 
These omissions do not certainly imply that we underestimate the importance of such aspects. 
Rather, by keeping the model focused and tractable, we managed to analyze the possible policy 
shifts that may mark Chinese development and monetary strategies in the future and to investigate 
their international and internal economic consequences. 
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1 Derivation of the equations characterizing an equilibrium path  
1.1 From firms’ first-order conditions with respect to labor, we get:    
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By using (A1) to obtain the labor demanded by each firm producing YjNt, the intertemporal problem of the 
representative firm producing nontradables can be solved by maximizing 
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.                                    (A8) 
1.3  By  using  (14)  to  obtain  the  labor  supplied  by  each  household,  the  intertemporal  problem  of  the 




























































} ] C P - C P - M - F E - B - T - M W L v jTt v jTt v jNt v jNt v jt 1 v jHt v jt 1 v jHt v jt 1 - v jt v jt v jt v jTt + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +p with 
respect to CjNt, CjTt, Mjt, BjHt+1, FjHt+1 and the Lagrange multiplier ljHt, and then by eliminating ljHt, thus 
obtaining: 
jNt jNt j jTt jTt j C )P - 1 ( C P h h = ,                (A9) 
1 -




jt j j ) C (P - ) C (P ] )M - 1 [( + + = q h c ,               (A10) 
) i (1 C P C P 1 jt jTt jTt j 1 jTt 1 jTt + + + + =q ,                           (A11) 
* t   t j, i    ), i (1 E C P C P E 1 it 1 jTt jTt jTt j 1 jTt 1 jTt jTt ³ ¹ + = + + + + q ,         (A12)   56 
j. i    )], - )(1 K (K G - C - K - K - Y [ P
) F )(F i (1 E ) B )(B i (1 - ) F (F E B B
j jNt jTt jTt jTt 1 jNt 1 jTt jTt jTt                                                     
        jGt jHt it jt - jGt jHt jt 1 jGt 1 jHt jt 1 jGt 1 jHt
¹ + +
= + + + + +
+ + =
+ + + + + +
d
      (A13) 
Notice that (A13) is obtained by using (19) (the government’s budget constraint) for substituting Tjt in the 
household’s budget constraint, and by using (2), (3), (6), (7), (18),(21) and (22).   
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= .                                  (A17) 
Finally, one can use (A17) and the production functions (1) and (5) to rewrite (A16) as (35). 
1.5 To derive (34), one can use GjNt=ζjGjTt, the equilibrium condition (22), the production function (1) and 
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= .                            (A19) 
Finally, one can use (A18) to rewrite (A19) as (34). 
1.6 To derive (38), one can use (A1) and the fact that 
j
jNt jNt K A
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) i (1
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,      (A20)   57 
Similarly, one can use (A2) and the fact that 
j
jTt jTt K A
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) i (1
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+ + d a
a
,      (A21) 
Finally, one can use (A17), (A20) and (A21) to obtain (36).  




] - 1 L ) - 1 ( [
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+
+ d a q
a                                   (A22) 
Finally, one can use (34) to rewrite (A22) as (37). 











³ . Furthermore, 





>  entails LjTt+LjNt=Hj, which—in its turn—implies 
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.  (A23)    
Finally,  jt - 1

































= (again,  consider  (11),  (14),  (21),  (A2)  and 
(A17)). Thus, one can use (A1) and (A17) to obtain  
jt - 1




































































.         (A24) 
1.9 To derive (41), rewrite (A10) as  
-1
jTt jTt jt jt
1 -
j j 1 jt jt
-1
j j ) C P ( M x    , ) (1 x - x ) - 1 ( º + = + m q h c ,              (A25) 
Since  1 ) (1
-1
j < + m q , equation (A25) is such that if xj0>xj then xjt→∞ as t→∞, if xj0<xj then xjt→-∞ as 
t→∞, if xj0=xj then xjt=xj  for all t, where









= . Therefore, the only value of xjt that is 
consistent  with  the  optimality  and  boundary  conditions  is  xjt=xj    for  all  t.  This  implies  that  along  an 













m q m h + +
= = .                   (A26) 
Considering (A26), one can use the one-price law (24) to obtain (41). 
2 Derivation of equation (46) 
Considering (31) and (A11), one can check that  
* t  t j, i    ,
C C P P





iTt 1 - jTt j 1 - jTt iTt










.    (A27) 
Considering (24), one has 





1 - jTt iTt




.                                   (A28) 
Thus, (A27) and (A28)—together—imply that in phase 2 one has  * t  t j, i    , 1
C C
C C
iTt 1 - jTt j
1 - iTt jTt i ³ ¹ =
q
q
, which in its 
turn  entails (46) (see equation (A22)).   
3 Derivation of equations (47)-(48) 
Equation (47) contains  ) g , L , L ( us chTt 1 chTt+ b  and  ) g , L , L ( ch chTt 1 chTt+ y , where   
usTt usTt
ust
us chTt 1 chTt K P
TA
- ) g , L , L ( = + b  is  obtained  by  setting  )  L ( L chTt usTt l =  (see  equation  (46))  and 
* t t    g g g us 1 ust ust ³ " = = +  in  
[ ] ( )
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+
+ + + + + +
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us 1 usTt us
ust usTt usTt us usTt usTt us us 1 usTt 1 usTt us L - ) L , L - H ( 1 ) - (1 -
g , L , L - H ), L , L - H ( ] - 1 L ) - 1 [(













ch chTt 1 chTt K P
TA
- ) g , L , L ( = + y  is  obtained by  setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L =  (see equation  (39))  and 
* t t    g g g ch 1 cht cht ³ " = = +  in   
[ ] ( )
( )
[ ] + +
+
+
+ + + + + +
+ + ch
chTt chTt chNt ch
1 cht 1 chTt 1 chNt 1 chTt 1 chNt
1 -
ch 1 chTt ch
cht chTt chNt chTt chNt ch 1 chTt 1 chNt L - ) L , L ( 1 ) - (1 -
g , L , L ), L , L ( ] - 1 L ) - 1 [(










( ) ( ) cht chTt chNt chTt chNt cht chTt chNt chTt chNt g , L , L ), L , L ( g , L , L ), L , L ( K C K G + , t>0.     (A30) 
In  their  turn,  equations  (A29)  and  (A30)  are  derived  by  using  (34),  (35),  (37),  (38)  and  (39)  (with 
usTt us usNt  L - H L = ). 
Equation  (48)  is  obtained  by  setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L = ,  )  L ( L chTt usTt l = , us 1 ust ust g g g = = +  and 
* t t    g g g ch 1 cht cht ³ " = = +  in    
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a ,  t>0,     (A31)   59 
where (A31) is derived from (36) by using (34), (35), (37), (38), and by setting  usTt us usNt  L - H L =  in equation 
(39). 
4 Derivation of inequality (49) 
Since 
usTt usTt
usTt usTt usNt usNt
usTt usTt
ust
us chTt 1 chTt K P
] Y P Y P [
K P
TA




b ,  one  can  use  (1),  (5),  (38),  (A17), 
usTt us usNt  L - H L = and  )  L ( L chTt usTt l =  to obtain (49). 
5 Proof that if LjTt→LjT as t→∞, then in Scenario A the country j’s rate of real GDP growth 
approaches  ] 1 ) [ j jT j j j - L - (1
j d a q r
a + = , where   jt
t
j   lim r r
¥ ®
=   
Considering (1), (5), (11), (37), (38), (39) (with  jTt j jNt  L - H L = ) and (A17), one can verify that the country 
j’s rate of real GDP growth is given in Scenario A by  
* t  t 1, -
) L - (H L
) L - (H L
L ) L - (H
L ) L - (H
) 1 (
1 jTt j j 1 jTt j
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,            (A32)  
where    
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+ + + +
r . 
 By  inspecting  (A32),  one  can  easily  check  that  LjTt→LjT  as  t→∞  implies  that  jt
t jt GDP
t
  lim   lim r r
¥ ® ¥ ®
= . 
Finally,  by  considering  (37)  and  (38),  one  can  also  check  that  LjTt→LjT  as  t→∞  implies  that 
] - 1 L ) - (1 [   lim j jT j j j jt
t
j d a q r r
a + = =
¥ ®
. Thus, LjTt→LjT as t→∞ entails  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [   lim j jT j j jt GDP
t




6 Proof that if θj>θi, j≠i, then in Scenario A LjT is a function of αj, γj, ηj, θj, δj, Hj, ζj and  j g  




iTt ®  whenever LjTt→LjT and LiTt→LiT as t→∞, j≠i. In 
its turn, this implies that as t→∞ equation (47) becomes    
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K =w(LjT,αj,γj,ηj,θj,δj,Hj,ζj, j g )=0,                        (A33) 
where w(LjT,αj,γj,ηj,θj,δj,Hj,ζj, j g )= - L -
L
) L - (H ) - 1 (
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. The asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in 
country  j’s  tradable  sector  is  a  value  of  LjTÎ[0,Hj]  that  satisfies  (A33).  If  it  exists,  this  asymptotic 
equilibrium  level  is  unique.  Indeed,  in  the  special  case  in  which  δj=1,  there  is  at  most  one  value  of 
LjTÎ[0,Hj] satisfying (A33): in this case, the equilibrium level of employment in country j’s tradable sector 
is this unique value of LjT. In the case in which δj<1, there are at most two values of LjTÎ[0,Hj] satisfying 
(A33) and the asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in country j’s tradable sector exists if the values 
of LjTÎ[0,Hj] satisfying (A33) are two. In this case, the equilibrium level of employment is the largest of 
these two values and it is unique, since the smallest value cannot be an equilibrium because it is inconsistent 
with  t   0 I I jTt jNt " ³ + .  Thus,  given  that  the  asymptotic  equilibrium  level  of  employment  in  country  j’s 
tradable sector is a value of LjT satisfying (A33) and it is unique, it is a function of αj, γj, ηj, θj, δj, Hj, ζj and 
j g : 
 LjT=p(αj,γj,ηj,θj,δj,Hj,ζj, j g ).                    (A34) 
7 Proof of Proposition 3 
Since  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ i iT i j jT j
i j d a d a
a a + = + , one can immediately see that LiT is a positive function of 
LjT=p(αj,γj,ηj,θj,δj,Hj,ζj, j g ), so that  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ i iT i i i
i d a q r
a + =  (i.e., the asymptotic rate of real GDP growth 
of country i) increases with LjT, j≠i.  



































= =p(αj,γj,ηj,θj,δj,Hj,ζj, 0 g j j ) g = ,  that  is  the 
asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in the tradable sector of country j conditional on  0 gj = , and 
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º . One can easily verify that  
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¶w        (A35) 
and  
if  j j z z < , then  0 0 g
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From (A35), (A36) and (A38)—together—one can conclude that  
LjT=p(αj,γj,ηj,θj,δj,Hj,ζj,
0 g
jT 0 g j
j
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 becomes smaller as ζj becomes closer to  j z , 
thus reducing the effect of a change in  j g  on the asymptotic rate of real GDP growth.  
8 Transitional path of the economy in Scenario A 
By solving the characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (47)-(48) around (LchT, Z=0), 














= k ,  where  1 1 > k  and  1 0 2 < <k ,  since  
0 -


















 (notice that all derivatives must be evaluated at (LchT, Z=0)). 
Having  only  one  initial  condition  (solely  Zt*  is  given  at  time  t*),  1 1 > k  and  1 0 2 < <k  imply  that  the 
linearized system is saddle-path stable.    62 
By using the eigenvector 
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1 chTt L > Y
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.  Given    0 - 2 1 > k k ,  this  implies  that—along  the 
transitional path—LchTt>LchT if and only if taus<0. 
9 Derivation of equations (55), (56) and (57) 
To derive the system (55)-(57), consider that  ( ) * t t 0   , L - H L , N ), L , L ( L chTt ch chTt cht chTt chNt chNt < < < = K L  













) L , N ( L

















h g h a h
a g
a
n .     (A40) 
Equation  (55)  contains  ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , N , L , N , (L ch us cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt + + V and  ) g ˆ , N , L , N , (L ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt + + J , 
where  ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , N , L , N , (L ch us cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt + + V is  obtained  by  setting 
) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ ), L , N ( , L ( L us ch chTt cht chTt usTt n f =  and  t   g ˆ g g us 1 ust ust " = = +  such  that  0<t<t*  in  (A29),  while 
) g ˆ , N , L , N , (L ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt + + J is  obtained  by  setting    ) L , N ( L chTt cht chNt n =  (see  equation  (54))  and 
t    g ˆ g g ch 1 cht cht " = = +  such that 0<t<t* in (A30).    
Equation (56) is obtained by setting    ), L , N ( L chTt cht chNt n =   ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ ), L , N ( , L ( L us ch chTt cht chTt usTt n f = , 
us 1 ust ust g ˆ g g = = +  and  t   g ˆ g g ch 1 cht cht " = = +  such that 0<t<t* in (A31).  
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a , t>0,   (A41) 
In its turn, equation (A41) is derived from (40) by using (34), (35), (37) and (38).  
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where  chT0 ch chT0 ch0
chT0
chN0
chN0 L - H L , N ,
K
K
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K
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 and Nch0 are given. 
10 Derivation of equations (58), (59) and (60) 
Equation  (58)  contains  ) g , L , L ( us chTt 1 chTt+ b and  ) g , N , L , N , L ( ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt + + m ,  where 
) g , L , L ( us chTt 1 chTt+ b is  obtained  by  setting  )  L ( L chTt usTt l =  and  us 1 ust ust g g g = = + * t t ³ "  in  (A29),  while 
) g , N , L , N , L ( ch cht chTt 1 cht 1 chTt + + m  is  obtained  by  setting  ) L , N ( L chTt cht chNt n =  and  ch 1 cht cht g g g = = +  
* t t ³ "  in (A30).   
Equation (59) is obtained by setting  ) L , N ( L chTt cht chNt n =  and  ch cht g g =   * t t ³ "  in (A41).   
Equation  (60)  is  obtained  by  setting    ), L , N ( L chTt cht chNt n =   )  L ( L chTt usTt l = ,  us ust g g =  and  ch cht g g =  
* t t ³ "  in (A31). 
11 Proof that if LjTt→LjT and Ncht→Nch as t→∞, then in Scenario B the country j’s rate of real GDP 
growth approaches  ] - L ) - (1 [ j jT j j j
j d a q r
a 1 + = , where   jt
t
j   lim r r
¥ ®
=   
Considering (1), (5), (11), (37), (38), (A17),  usTt us usNt  L - H L =  and  ) L , N ( L chTt cht chNt n = , one can verify 
that the US rate of real GDP growth is given also in Scenario B by (A32), while China’s rate of real GDP 
growth is given by  
1 -
) L , N ( L
) L , N ( L
L ] ) L , N ( [
L ] ) L , N ( [
) 1 (
1 chTt 1 cht ch 1 chTt ch
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.           (A45)    64 




  lim   lim r r
¥ ® ¥ ®
= .  Finally,  by  considering  (37)  and  (38),  one  can  also  check  that  LjTt→LjT  and 
Ncht→Nch as t→∞ imply that  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [   lim j jT j j j jt
t
j d a q r r
a + = =
¥ ®
, j=us,ch. Thus, LjTt→LjT and Ncht→Nch 
as t→∞ entail  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [   lim j jT j j jt GDP
t




12 Transitional path of the economy in Scenario B 
By solving the characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (58)-(60) around (LchT,Nch,Z=0), 
one  can  find  the  eigenvalues  21 12 22 11
2
22 11 22 11













= j j  and  j3=a33,  where 
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= (notice that all 
derivatives must be evaluated at (LchT,Nch,Z=0)). One can easily check that 0<j3<1 since 
) ch 1 (













Moreover, for admissible sets of parameter values one can show that j1>1 and j2>1 (for instance, setting 
αch=γch=2/3,  ηch=0.5,  dch=0.05,  θch=0.95,  θus=0.945,  Hch=0.3552635,  wch=0.01,  0 gch = ,  one  obtains: 
LchT=0.1977922,  LchN=0.1383763,  Nch=0.5078785,  Z=0,  ρus=0.0046842,  j1=1.0715746,  j2=2.0797334, 
j3=0.9947368). Having two endogenous variables whose value is pre-determined at time t (Zt* and Ncht* are 
given), j1>1, j2>1 and 0<j3<1 imply that the linearized system is unstable. In the special case in which the 
policy makers manage to control the economy so as to enter phase 2 with (Nch-Ncht*)=q23Zt*, the linearized 
system  can  converge  to  (LchT,Nch,Z=0)  along  the  path  governed  by  (61)-(63),  where  the  eigenvectors 
)] a - )( a - ( - a [a
)] a - ( a a [a
- q
22 3 11 3 21 12
22 3 13 23 12
13 j j
j +
=  and 
)] a - )( a - ( - a [a
)] a - ( a a [a
- q
22 3 11 3 21 12
11 3 23 21 13
23 j j
j +
=  can be computed by using a11, a12, 
a21, a22,   
1 chTt L 1 cht N 1 chTt N 1 chTt L




+ + + +
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=   and 
1 chTt L 1 cht N 1 chTt N 1 chTt L
1 chTt L t Z
23 -
a
+ + + +
+
G X G X
G X
= .    
13 Derivation of equations (64) and (65) 
Equation  (64) contains  ) Q , g ˆ , L , (L us chTt 1 chTt+ s and  ) g ˆ , L , (L ch chTt 1 chTt+ o ,  where  ) Q , g ˆ , L , (L us chTt 1 chTt+ s  is 
obtained by setting ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , L - H , L ( L us ch chTt ch chTt usTt f =  and  ° ³ " = = + t t   g ˆ g g us 1 ust ust  in (A29), while 
) g ˆ , L , (L ch chTt 1 chTt+ o is obtained by setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L =  and  ° ³ " = = + t t    g ˆ g g ch 1 cht cht  in (A30).  
Equation  (65)  is  obtained  by  setting  chTt ch chNt  L - H L = ,  ) Q , g ˆ , g ˆ , L - H , L ( L us ch chTt ch chTt usTt f = , 
us 1 ust ust g ˆ g g = = +  and  ° ³ " = = + t t    g ˆ g g ch 1 cht cht  in (A31). 
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= .                                            (A46) 
 By using (38), LjNt=Hj-LjTt and  j 1 jt jt g ˆ g g = = + one can rewrite (34) as 
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c .     (A47) 








, (A46) implies that  
Q) , L ( L chTt usTt h = ,         (A48) 








 and  ( )
0
Q
Q , LchTt <
¶
¶h
.   
Since  the asymptotic  rate of real  GDP  growth  of country j is  given  by  ] - 1 L ) - (1 [ j jT j j j
j d a q r
a + =  (see 
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. Given (A48), this implies that ρch>ρus if and only if  
Q) , L (
) - (1















 + a a
a q
d q d a q
.       (A49) 
Moreover, ρch>ρus implies that as t→∞ equation (64) becomes w(LchT,αch,γch,ηch,θch,δch,Hch,ζch, ch g ˆ )=0 
(see equation (A33)), from which one can derive the asymptotic equilibrium level of employment in the 
Chinese  tradable  sector,  LchT=p(αch,γch,ηch,θch,δch,Hch,ζch, ch g ˆ ).  Hence,  one  can  rewrite  the  inequality 
(A49) as  
Q). ), g ˆ , , H , , , , , ( (                                                                            
) - (1
) - 1 ( - ] - 1 )] g ˆ , , H , , , , , ( )[ - (1 [
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Since  ( )
0
Q
Q , LchTt <
¶
¶h
, the inequality (A50) holds for all  Q Q > , where Q is that value of Q satisfying   66 
 
Q). ), g ˆ , , H , , , , , ( (                                                                            
) - (1
) - 1 ( - ] - 1 )] g ˆ , , H , , , , , ( )[ - (1 [
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z d q h g a
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   (A51)  
Considering (A47), (A48) and (A51), one can see that Q depends on αch, γch, ηch, θch, δch, Hch, ζch,  ch g ˆ , 
αus, γus, ηus, θus, δus, Hus, ζus and  us g ˆ . 
Finally, notice that if  Q Q >  one has ρch>ρus, implying that LchT=p(αch,γch,ηch,θch,δch,Hch,ζch, ch g ˆ ).  
15 Transitional path of the economy in Scenario C 
By solving the characteristic equation of the system obtained by linearizing (64)-(65) around (LchT, Z=0), 














= b ,  where  1 1 > b  and  1 0 2 < < b ,  since  
0 -


















 (notice that all derivatives must be evaluated at (LchT, Z=0)). 
Having  only  one  initial  condition  (solely  Zt°  is  given  at  time  t°),  1 1 > b  and  1 0 2 < < b  imply  that  the 
linearized system is saddle-path stable.  
By using the eigenvector 
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.  Given    0 - 2 1 > b b ,  this  implies  that—along  the 
transitional path—LchTt>LchT if and only if taus<0.  
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